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English Public Opinion

After the Restoration

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CONTENTS

CHAP.	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	7
I. THE ENGLISH VIEW OF THE DUTCH (1660-1665) .	14
II. PUBLIC OPINION DURING THE WAR (1665-1668) .	49
III. THE ENGLISH VIEW OF THE DUTCH (1668-1674) .	67
IV. THE ENGLISH VIEW OF FRANCE	86
V. THE NATIONAL CHARACTER	107
VI. THE EFFECTS OF THE REVOLUTION . . .	124

INTRODUCTION

THE purpose of the ensuing work is to describe English public opinion in the fifty years after the Restoration. It is intended to deal less with constitutional development than with the popular view of national duty and interest, a subject which has rarely been examined and never exploited. Other aspects of British history during this period have had numberless exponents; the policy of the government is almost notorious. Yet the people's idea of politics—the idea of the private citizen and unrecognised pamphleteer—has been commonly ignored, although no phase of English life was then more characteristic, or left a deeper impress on the course of subsequent history.

It will be seen how public opinion under Charles II. was coloured throughout by a mercantile ambition, which foreshadowed the later evolution of the national character, and differentiated the age from the previous times when dynastic and theological considerations ruled every act of state. In 1688 the typical Englishman looked on maritime and commercial enterprise as the

ideal mission of his race. His attitude towards the Dutch and the French had thus become fixed quite independently of the work or wish of Crown or Parliament. Trade had taken the place of religion as the pivot of international relations, and even the most Christian king ascribed success not to the better faith, but to the last pistole. There is, in fact, a remarkable and suggestive community of ideas between the school of Shaftesbury and Downing and that of later day Imperialists, which should at least enable us to approach the reign of Charles II. with interest and curiosity instead of the customary aversion and distaste.

It would indeed be deplorable if the busy and practical life of the average Englishman of this period were to be relegated impatiently to the oblivion which some of its attributes deserve. There are in reality very few epochs in our history in which the sounder elements of society have been wholly submerged. If reigns like that of Mary are best forgotten, another class, which contains that of Charles II. is in many ways worthy of remembrance. Bad administration does not always imply a national decadence. It is a mistake to judge a people by its figure-heads, for only the greatest government really succeeds in embodying all the contemporary public spirit. Yet the popularity of this

wrong view does necessitate a plea for a fair hearing as a preliminary to an account of an age in which England's rulers were mostly beneath contempt.

States, then, are not to be merely judged by their leading men. No doubt Raleigh was a fair type of Elizabethan England, and Cromwell certainly represented the best hopes of the men who sang psalms in Marston cornfields, and swept the Spaniards from the Dunkirk dunes. The phenomenon is also common in autocracies. The Great Elector typified the heroic selfishness which made Brandenburg what it became, when he had Kalkstein beheaded at Memel and chased the Swedes over the Pomeranian peat-bogs. Napoleon was certainly, as he put it himself,¹ "the man of the State—the French Revolution." It is otherwise as a rule. The ordinary administration in a free country is merely the accidental outcome of political manœuvres, and it is absurd without inquiry to endow subjects with their rulers' virtues or vices.

Thus the treatment meted out by historians to the England of Charles II. has been traditionally unjust. Like the Bourbons, they have forgotten nothing. They recall the ships ablaze in the Medway, while the

¹ "Memoirs of Madame de Rémusat," i. p. 207 (ed. 1880).

King was feeding his ducks¹ "on the west side of the Park," the spaniels² that littered in the palace, the mistresses who, in Clarendon's indignant language,³ "were as bold with God Almighty as with any of His creatures." In this, indeed, there is nothing surprising, for there never was a more unprincipled monarch than the King whom Englishmen called Old Rowley,⁴ after "an ill-favoured but famous horse in the royal mews."

There was, however, a far brighter side to the story of his reign, and whatever blemishes mar the morality of its public spirit, no fair critic will deny the wisdom of its ambition nor the intelligence of its enterprise. Human nature does not alter with every change in government, and patriotism and love of adventure did not die with the Commonwealth. The period witnessed the origin of New York, the foundation of the Hudson Bay Company, and a vast expansion of English commercial energy. These are aspects more typical of the day than its uglier and more familiar scenes—Louise de Quérouaille at Whitehall, Charles II. at Dover, and

¹ Oldmixon's "England under the Stuarts," p. 532.

² Evelyn's Diary (ed. 1854), ii. 207.

³ "Life of Edward, Earl of Clarendon." by himself (Oxford, 1759), i. 340.

⁴ Cunningham's "Nell Gwyn" (ed. 1892), p. 110.

Lord Chief Justice Scroggs in the Popish Plot panic,¹ "hewing down Popery as Scanderbeg hewed the Turks." At all events, no one who looks quietly at the real opinions of the time, will fail to note their sane and sober vigour. The decline of superstition among the upper classes coincided with a growth of political insight among the mass of the people. This development long outlived measures like the Conventicle Act and men like the "Cabal."

Parliamentary debates do not sum up the all in all of the national life; domestic politics have often no lasting importance. English freedom survived the burning of Milton's works at Oxford. Of course, we need not underestimate the good laws of the period, nor paint some of its years as a mere turbid backwater in the annals of the constitution. On the other hand, it is essential to realise that English history was far more deeply affected by less conspicuous agents than Parliamentary debaters. The reign furnished no such degenerate anticlimax to the epic grandeur of Cromwellian government as has often been imagined by those who deduce from the misdeeds of a few individuals a national deterioration. The coins of Charles II., best worth recollection, are not French louis d'or, but are those silver crowns in which

¹ North's "Examen" (ed. 1740) p. 206.

small inlaid figures of elephants signify that they were made from the spoils of the Dutch Guinea fleet, and were an earnest of Greater Britain.

Of course a description of English opinion should not err on the other side. It was far too materialistic to deserve a panegyric, too inconsistent to earn thorough approbation. It was also glaringly deficient in ethical breadth. As Machiavelli said, the schemes of the unarmed prophet are bound to come to nought; so those of England at this time were efficient but not pacific. They were sanctioned by no moral code, and designed to further an ideal which had¹ "no cognation with love and honour." Her citizens had the failings as well as the great qualities of Empire-builders; their work was even in a measure directed to an end of which they were scarcely conscious. Nevertheless, dimly as they grasped their own purpose, they yet fought the good fight for the expansion of England, and (human nature being what it is) some among them even merit a place in the history of heroes.

The development of public opinion under Charles II. found its sequel in the policy of the next generation, which broke the bonds of James II.'s despotic government, and gave

¹ "Britannia Languens" (London, 1680), Preface by Philanglus.

to England a distinctive cast of political thought that has since swayed her actions. The Revolution set the seal upon the downfall of two principles—the dynastic and the theological—that had hitherto rivalled the commercial principle as forces in society. Thenceforward the country was free from these two influences, which always deter states from following the dictates of unhamp-ered reason. Thus that phase in the history of public opinion which occupies the reigns of the later Stuarts ended in 1688. In spite of his ruder habits and narrower vision, the subject of William and Mary was in effect the modern Englishman. Governed as he was by an oligarchy and ignorant as he was of foreign diplomacy, he yet had in him the making of the later day democrat and the later day politician. The interest that attaches to the second half of the seventeenth century in England is therefore due to its being the transition stage between that period when foreign policy was only an exclusive luxury of rulers and our own age when every citizen has at least a potential share in its guidance. This epoch saw public opinion slowly liberated both from monarchical and ecclesiastical fetters. Alike in its intelligence and in its budding commercialism, in its incipient theory of expansion and in its growing sense of purpose, it was the seed-time of the Empire.

CHAPTER I

THE ENGLISH VIEW OF THE DUTCH (1660-1665)

FOR the first fifteen years of Charles II.'s reign the chief feature in its public opinion was jealousy of the Netherlands, just as the chief feature of its last ten years was jealousy of France. It is impossible to appreciate the strength and reason of the sentiment without first realising the astonishing greatness of the country which provoked it. During the seventeenth century its position could hardly be mentioned without a luxuriance of flattering epithets. Within twenty years of the peace of 1609 the Belgic Lion, which was the emblem of its Estates, had become as notable a symbol as the wheatsheaf of the Vasas. The Dutch East India Company monopolised a great part of the Asiatic trade, and the West India Company all but conquered Brazil.

Holland paid nearly sixty per cent. of the taxes of the whole country, and was the

pre-eminent province. Proud to be "the common refuge of all miserable men,"¹ it was the stronghold of freedom as well as the centre of the world's industry, letters, banking, and manufacture. Although the nature of their land² made the Dutch go abroad to find not only flax and hemp, pitch, wood, and iron, but also their corn and their wool, they yet equipped the largest fleet in existence, and became carriers for all nations. They had no poor men³ among them, nor any illiterate. They met a debt of sixty-five millions⁴ with ease, and their patriotism triumphed even over their bad form of government. It animated the enterprise of Heemskirk and Barendtz, and the wisdom of Grotius.

The responsibility for the decline of the Netherlands lies largely at the gates of the English. The Dutch never yielded to Louis XIV., but their naval struggles against Cromwell and Charles II. had really sapped their power, and their glory departed. They could not stand the strain of everlasting war.⁵ The contrast between the

¹ Temple's "Observations upon the Netherlands" (ed. 1693), p. 219.

² *Ibid.*, p. 209.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 234. "England's Wants" (1667), p. 19.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 252.

⁵ Between 1563 and 1714, the Dutch spent 105 years in warfare.

state of de Witt and van Tromp and that of the next century is so appalling, and the motives of England in effecting it were so glaringly selfish that a moralist pure and simple would not hesitate to deny that even British greatness was not a sufficiently noble end to justify such brutal means. The policy, which Cromwell's Navigation Act inaugurated, was a masterpiece of heartlessness.

It does not, however, appear that practical politicians have ever been willing to weigh their actions by an ethical code which disregards national bias and political expediency. Nothing great has ever been effected in the world without a war, and when a cause very dear to the heart is endangered there can be nothing more aggravating than the persistency of strict precisians. The man of the world feels towards them as Ninon de l'Enclos felt in the presence of Choiseul. "Ah, my lord, how many virtues you make me detest."¹ At all events, to the English patriot at this time political exigencies negated all possibility of a moral issue. He merely knew that the Dutch as carriers would be more vulnerable² than the English, and that

¹ St Simon's "Memoirs" (ed. St John), i. 327.

² Temple's "Observations," p. 261.

there was a fair chance of success. Although the United Provinces were more densely populated than England,¹ the latter had between two and three times as many inhabitants. The subject of Charles II. saw that war was inevitable because the path to Greater Britain lay over the graves of other Empires. What he called Willoughby Land, the Dutch called Surinam. There were numberless points of international dispute. The Dutch resented the enforcement of salutes at sea, and considered the English as still an "unendurable nation,"² while they themselves were objects of an even more bitter jealousy.

All the trading companies in England were bent on a war to crush competition. The Levant Company petitioned for redress in May 1661, and the Council of Trade³ in April 1664, on account of "the fraud and practice of the Dutch." Insults to the English flag at Surat⁴ were deemed to necessitate a more stringent Navigation Act, although to so good an observer as Roger Coke⁵

¹ Gregory King's "Observations upon the State of England," 1696, p. 36 (in Chalmers' edition, 1810).

² P. J. Blok's "Hist. Neth." (1900), iii. 492.

³ Cal. State Papers, D., 1660-1, p. 591 (18th May 1661).

⁴ Pepys' Diary, p. 196 (15th February 1664).

⁵ Coke's "Discourse upon Trade" (1670), p. 27.

it seemed to have lost England her trade in the Baltic and in Greenland. North Sea fishermen wished to avenge their inferiority upon their Dutch rivals, of whom no less than six thousand herring fishers¹ lived in Amsterdam alone. Others hoped to gain complete ascendancy in Greenland and Newfoundland² — then called Newland. Albemarle's view was that the sea cannot have two masters, and this was clearly the general idea. Public opinion was almost unanimous in deciding that the Dutch might indeed be imitated in some respects but dreaded in everything. If Amsterdam was in truth "the most famous city for trade in all the world," it was to be feared all the more. The sense of inferiority breeds hatred, and this feeling was common.

Writers by no means fond of Holland thought to profit by her example. Ludlow³ regretted that Blake once liberated Dutch fishermen who might have taught Englishmen their craft. The "true lover of his country," who wrote "England's Wants" in 1667, advocated the establishment of

¹ "England's Guide to Industry" (1683), by J. S., p. 238.

² *Ibid.*, p. 221.

³ Ludlow's "Memoirs," i. 325.

alms-houses,¹ "as is done in Holland," and the greater care of youth, in order to emulate the prosperity of Amsterdam, where "there is not a beggar among so many hundred thousand."² England ought to have collections in churches "during the sermon,"³ according to the Dutch fashion. One pamphleteer cites the Netherlands as the best proof of the saying that "traffick is the only thing that makes a country rich."⁴ Another says of the collecting of taxes, "I refer this to the practice of Holland,"⁵ while a third praises its national granary.⁶ The Dutch were the best inventors and best gardeners in Europe, and English agriculture owed a great debt to Gabriel Plattes. Roger Palmer—the talented and honest Romanist, who was one of the few men to have a title thrust upon him—called Holland "a wise and prudent nation,"⁷ although himself a lover of France. A controversy as to usury laws sprang up

¹ "England's Wants" (1667), p. 8.

² *Ibid.*, p. 19. As late as William III.'s reign, the number of beggars in London was "an eye-sore" ("Misson's Memoirs and Observations," p. 130).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁴ "Present Interest of England" (1671), p. 5.

⁵ "Treatise on Taxes" (1667), p. 72.

⁶ "Britannia Languens," p. 32.

⁷ Castlemaine's "War between England and the Dutch" (1671), p. 103.

in 1668, and each tract referred at length to the example of Holland, where "riches do so abound"¹ that interest never rises over four per cent.² in spite of the absence of a usury law, and where the government borrows at three per cent.³ as against the English loans at six, the French at seven, and the Spanish at from ten to twelve. The Dutch paid better wages⁴ than any other paymasters except the Russian Emperor and Venice. Bethel⁵ contrasted the dearness of law and medicine in England with their cheapness in Holland, where physic cost only twelve stivers (13d.) for the richest patients, and law only half-a-crown. In England they cost from ten to twenty times as much, being also more expensive than in France.⁶ Dutch commercial methods were especially unrivalled, and their book-keeping⁷ was deemed inimitable as late as Queen Anne's reign. Their tariff was a century in advance of the English.⁸

¹ Thomas Manley on Usury (1669).

² Temple's "Observations," p. 252.

³ "The World's Mistake in Oliver Cromwell" (1668), p. 8.

⁴ Peacham's "Worth of a Penny" (1667), p. 32.

⁵ S. Bethel's "Interest of the Princes of Europe" (1681), pp. 6-7.

⁶ "Britannia Languens," p. 3.

⁷ *Spectator*, No. 174.

⁸ "Britannia Languens," p. 52.

The consequent jealousy in England was the leading feature in its common policy, and it found even in Puritanism accommodating ethics. Public opinion was impregnated with the idea that the two nations were natural enemies. The most characteristic work of the day was a pamphlet written in this spirit by one Robert Clavell, a bookseller, who gained a certain fame by publishing lists of current literature "at the Staggs-Head in Ivy Lane." It was entitled "His Majesties Propriety and Dominion on the British Seas,"¹ and ranged over all the spheres of international controversy.

The pamphlet was dedicated to Albemarle, and prefaced by an attack on the Dutch, who "put their oares into every boat where gain and profit doth appear." Clavell contrasts the Dutch edict against the sale of white herrings by Englishmen in Holland with English lenity to Dutchmen who fish in our waters and destroy the spawn. He then lays down two postulates—first, that the sea is capable of being privately owned, secondly, that Great Britain owns all the adjacent seas. The first point is proved by sundry references to the Bible and to titles claimed by Pompey and by Tyre and Carthage; the second by a more

¹ 1665.

elaborate appeal to past history after the manner of Selden. The ancient Britons considered themselves masters of the water in their twig barks covered by ox hides. Edward III. was lord of the ocean, and the English Admiralty¹ originally implied dominion over every sea. The Dutch only fished in the North Sea by sanction of the governor of Scarborough Castle.²

Clavell then deserts the past for the present. After all, the question of the day was neither philosophical nor antiquarian. The result of his change of tone is noteworthy. The writer had nothing of the Italian subtlety, which alone makes an academic treatise effective in practical life, and which constituted the chief charm of the style of Sarpi and his school. As Clavell put it himself, his was a "ruder pen." He never feigned impartiality, but with a partisan's frankness appealed to the passion of the hour, not to the judgment of posterity. Consequently the reader feels that he is listening to the pleader of a living cause. From Christmas to mid-Lent,³ he argues, the Dutch fish English cod and ling off Padstow. From Easter to Whitsuntide they catch English cod off Whitehaven, and afterwards English hake in St

¹ Clavell, p. 25.

² *Ibid.*, p. 26.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

George's Channel. From June to November they fish English herrings in the North Sea.

It is therefore easy to understand the public opinion of the day. The sensitive patriot was stung by the contrast between the struggling fishermen in the Whitby cobbles¹ and the rich, heavy-laden Dutch herring busses thriving on an English province in Robin Hood's Bay. Holland had over ten thousand sails "more than are in England, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Denmark, Poland, Sweden and Russia."² She imported the wines³ and luxuries of France, Spain and Italy, the spices of the East, the merchandise of "Frankford," the iron, steel, and glass of Germany to her heart's content—and all paid for by means of wealth filched from the English people in English waters. She even competed with Yarmouth salesmen in England herself. Such was Clavell's argument, and its point was glaring then, and is intelligible now. The country felt it had not a fair chance against Dutch competition without the help of the government. No doubt the English were the better race; "a double Dutchman floundering in a continent of mud" was

¹ Clavell, p. 76.

² *Ibid.*, p. 80.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

Robert Hall's derisive description of John Owen, the theologian. At the same time, Dutch superiority in trade was none the less genuine for being artificial.

The last part of Clavell's work was devoted to past records of Dutch insolence. In sixteen pages¹ he told the heart-rending tale of the Massacre of Amboyna, the memory of which had lasted forty years already, and which it was hard indeed for England to forget or forgive. He ended with a plea as to the war which had just broken out between the two nations; he would have his readers believe that Holmes's raid² in Goree was not sanctioned by the government, and that de Ruyter's departure³ from the Mediterranean to operate against the English settlements in West Africa was at once a hostile act and a breach of trust.

There was little literary art in these pamphlets which strengthened the popular purpose, but they are persuasive even now, and to men who felt the same stress of competition which they depicted they must have seemed as just as they were forcible. Englishmen felt with Clavell that the Dutch were formidable rivals, and so upbraided them

¹ Clavell, pp. 153-169.

² *Ibid.*, p. 175.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

as monsters and vipers with indecorous want of calm.¹ Scurrility was then considered to be the seasoning of argument.

Even the quieter political tracts of the day show how resolute the nation was in this hostility, until the war of 1672-4 restored the balance of commercial prosperity, and turned men's enmity from Holland to France. The general ambition was, as one writer expressed it, to be "the emporium of Europe if not of the world."² In 1664 this was nothing more than a golden hope, for the English were far behind the Dutch, for reasons which were clear to all thinkers shrewder than an author, who could only attribute it to the bishops. "The trading stock of the nation is devoured in this prelatical gulph."³ One of the better treatises of the time is that on taxes, published by N. Brooke in 1667, the work of Sir William Petty, whose economic views were very liberal, and who had been educated himself at Leyden, Utrecht, and Amsterdam. Its tone is remarkably modern and its views moderate, for, while the writer urges that "to be always in a posture of war at home is the cheapest way to keep off war from

¹ Clavell, p. 121.

² "The Office of Credit" (London, 1665), p. 9.

³ "An Answer out of the West to a Question out of the North" (1665), p. 5.

abroad,"¹ he says that there is no worse delusion than to hold that "the greatness and glory of a Prince lieth rather in the extent of his territory than in the art and industry of his people."² He sees that the rise of Dutch commerce which "hath so madded us here in England,"³ must be checked, and his very sane remedies⁴—immigration of skilled aliens, less government interference, encouragement of shipping—are all dictated by that one end.

The chief fault of this aspect of public opinion lay in its want of imagination. The men who worked and wrote in order to raise the country into the position then occupied by the Netherlands, had a fair share of the commercial ardour which inspired England for the first time under the Tudors, but the wider thought of Empire, which differentiates the British statesman from the mere politician, hardly struck them at all. The popular view of colonial policy was not so grotesque as Locke's when he wrote his feudal constitution for Carolina, but it was still wanting in breadth and insight. Raleigh was constantly quoted,⁵ but his colonial aims

¹ "Treatise on Taxes" (1667), p. 5.

² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁵ *E.g.*, by Bethel: "Interest of the Princes and States of Europe" (1681), p. 57; by "Philanglus" in "Britannia Languens" (1680), pp. 32, 37, 45, 118; and by W. C. in "England's Interest" (1671), p. 11.

were never fully understood. As England had but five and a half million inhabitants,¹ there was (strictly speaking) no surplus population at all. Even the shrewdest can never anticipate the actual future: Gregory King² predicted that London would have 1,059,840 inhabitants in 1900. It was therefore natural that Roger Coke's *Discourse on Trade* (1670)³ deprecated migration to American and Irish plantations as likely to weaken English resources at home. This perverted view, expressed as it is amid much that is admirably logical, only illustrates how Greater Britain like British India grew up with no conscious purpose. It was the chance product of national enterprise, not the fruit of any luminous idealism. The ultimate loss of the American colonies was due to the incompatibility of a great Empire with little minds.

Yet this narrowness does not detract much from the solid worth of the opinion of this period, for it is too common a characteristic of trading communities. They are far more

¹ Gregory King's "Observations upon the State of England" (1696), p. 36.

² *Ibid.*, p. 43.

³ Coke's "Discourse on Trade" (1670), p. 7. Cf. "Britannia Languens," p. 121.

prone to be intelligent than imaginative, and even Venice imbued her policy with no semblance of romance. Sarpi said that a merchant is of necessity half an alien; in other words, his outlook is rarely more than personal. Certainly, for a long period in English history, he had no notion of subordinating the interests of trade to the glory of the country—a characteristic not wholly to be attributed to the national distaste for airy abstractions. If we believe in modern Imperialism, we shall deem it a saving grace of this feature in English life that the requirements of commerce have harmonised with those of the Empire with singular consistency. Except during the vogue of the Manchester school, the trading class has aimed at the expansion of England, and this object has been simply prompted by enlightened self-interest. Patriotism is profitable.

It was therefore most natural for the politicians of Charles II.'s reign to treat the Dutch question in no wide or exalted spirit. The average man who makes history is not a high-souled dreamer; he rarely looks to what preceded and to what will follow his own sojourn on earth. Even the greatest patriots of this age were thus no more sagaciously contemplative than the common

ruck of politicians, who as a class look generally at the need of the hour only, and are, in the main, of the world worldly. After all, Cavours are more useful than Mazzinis, and a sensible conservatism is the first requisite of a well-ordered community.

It was thus that the better type of the partisans of the crusade against Holland represented a safe English tradition in leaving potentialities to the dreamers of day-dreams, and facing present problems with a sober zeal. It was their deliberate wish to supplant the United Provinces by Great Britain, and in the end they carried out that wonderful work. Certainly, whatever were their lapses from the path of virtue, it is absurd to paint these men as either vain hirelings or as ignorant babblers. Trade produces no such characters. The literary champions of this industrial militarism had indeed nothing of the learning or taste that has marked some political controversialists, but they were therefore more effective writers, as they had to make no sacrifice to equip themselves for disputes in which humaner gifts are wholly wasted. Those who feared Dutch competition were no mere alarmists, but men of the world, whose practical English polemics had far more force than the sonorous Latin of Milton's indignant essays. It is remarkable

too that they were as familiar with Dutch affairs as the Court was with those of France.

English public opinion was indeed strengthened by knowledge, for the intimacy¹ between the two nations was great. The idea of nationality was so little respected that Cromwell had even believed in the practicability of an amalgamation, in the interest of religion. Inter-marriages were common. Arlington was married to Isabella, daughter of Lewis of Nassau; Sir William Penn to Margaret, daughter of Hans Jasper of Rotterdam. One Dutchman—Kirkhoven, married Lord Wotton's daughter; another was the husband of Mrs Aphra Behn. England welcomed Dutchmen of education; Huygens, inventor of the pendulum, was even "elected into our society."² Cornelius van Drebbel, who made the first thermometer, lived in London but had been born at Alkmaar, while Isaac Vossius, whom Charles II. made canon of Windsor, was a native of Leyden, and Grinling Gibbons³ of Rotterdam. The fashionable world patronised Huysman, a Dutch "picture-drawer," Peter van der

¹ Larwood's "Story of the London Parks," pp., 350, 365.

² Evelyn's Diary, i. 347 (1st April 1661).

³ *Ibid.*, ii. 56 (18th Jan. 1671).

Banck, a line engraver, Simon Varelst, who painted flowers, Loton, who drew landscapes, and Dankers,¹ a native of the Hague, who sketched the King's palaces and seaports. Thomas Marshall went to Amsterdam to obtain type for the Oxford press, and Robert Barclay and George Fox to hold religious meetings. Trade effected a great intercourse between the two peoples. The stuffs and stockings of Norwich had their best market² in Holland, and Rotterdam was "very full of English and Scotch inhabitants." There was an English staple at Dort,³ a Scotch at Terveer. Pepys' brother went to Holland to seek his fortune, and a Dutchman went with Pepys himself on one occasion to spend a merry evening together at "the World's End."⁴ Nicholas Barbon, the economist and inventor of fire insurance, had studied at Leyden and Utrecht.

The letters of the day show a lively acquaintance with Dutch writers, and Locke⁵ did not speak unintelligibly when he used Dutch illustrations to explain a passage in Cicero. The sixth book of "Paradise Lost,"

¹ Pepys' Diary, p. 581 (5th April 1669).

² "England's Guide to Industry," p. 27.

³ Temple's "Observations upon the Netherlands," pp. 226-7.

⁴ Pepys, 31st May 1666.

⁵ Locke's Works (ed. 1823) ii. 188.

composed in 1667, borrowed something from the "Lucifer" of Joost van den Vondel (1654), and Hobbes's works were printed at Amsterdam, like many other pieces of contentious literature. The writer of the "Netherland Historian" (a national Dutch work printed by Stephen Swart at Amsterdam in 1675) knew the despatches of Rupert as well as he knew those of de Ruyter and the Prince of Orange, while the English pamphleteers on their part appreciated every detail in the policies of the two opposing Dutch factions.

The men whose views really deserved the title of English public opinion, were thus familiar with the people whom they longed to humble. The expert is always at a great advantage in political controversy, and these clear-sighted traders moulded popular thought with singular success. The nation never supported a war with more alacrity. Of course there was inevitably a small class who would not recognise that the burden of conflict is meant for every shoulder, and who allowed their love of peace to temper their love of country. There is but a fine line between the indifference of the would-be cosmopolitan and open enmity. Algernon Sidney¹ pressed de Witt to invade England,

¹ Ludlow's Memoirs, ii. 377.

offered Louis XIV. to raise an insurrection, in consideration of a hundred thousand crowns, and subsequently took heavy bribes from Barillon; so greatly did he prefer republicanism to the welfare of his own land. English refugees¹ at Leyden clamoured to be led against the English monarchy. Something may be said to extenuate their conduct, for they were already expatriated and proscribed, and starvation² and disgust are also partial excuses for naval deserters who joined de Ruyter in the Medway in 1667. Nothing however can be said to gloss over the criminal lack of patriotism in one Doleman,³ who was Colonel commanding the land forces on board the Dutch fleet, and in those men of the seven Anglo-Scottish regiments⁴ in Holland, who agreed to remain in her service on being disbanded at the beginning of the war.

Happily, the bulk of the English people accepted the predominant policy without demur. With all his distrust of the future and his dislike for the King's advisers, Clarendon, the typical Englishman, stood

¹ Ludlow's Memoirs, ii. 377.

² Pepys' Diary, p. 400 (14th June 1667).

³ Ludlow's Memoirs, ii. 401 (*note*). Cal. State Papers, 1667, p. 119.

⁴ *Ibid.*, ii. 400.

stolidly by the new order of opinion and prayed for success. It was a fine example of the best tradition of English politics, which shines splendidly in comparison with the disgraceful methods of later public men like Fox and Cobbett. At the time, indeed, its virtue was hardly realised, for the sale of Dunkirk and the enactment of the Clarendon code had obscured the better qualities of their reactionary author, against whose school it was always idle to argue¹ that Christians are called to unite upon the rock of Christ, not upon "the wool-packs of ceremonies." He was a better patriot than statesman. Loyalty like his did what mere reasoning could not always do, and the consequent unanimity of public opinion as to the proper attitude towards Holland, was impressive and memorable.

Nothing better illustrates the continuity of the national spirit after the Restoration than the characters of the men who directed it. Albemarle, Shaftesbury, and Downing were of the same school as Blake and Vane; they represented the most solid political attainments of the Cromwellian party, and were heart and soul for the cause and for war. Albemarle was the same man as the Monck of 1660,

¹ Alsop's "*Melius Inquirendum*" (1681), p. 94.

—a hard, avaricious, self-seeking soldier,¹ who embodied the material aspirations of his age, the one man of note who stayed in London during the plague, the one man undaunted when the *Royal Charles* ran aground in the fight of 7th June 1672,—yet with nothing of the hero in him except valour. From Carlyle² he won a testimony of saying little and doing much, but his rugged exterior concealed no tenderness at all. Cosmo de' Medici,³ who visited him at Newhall in 1669, saw “nothing particularly fine or noble in his features”; he was in fact made of very common clay. The keen judgment of Napoleon⁴ placed him along with the Frenchman, Moreau, among those persons, “who do not know how to wear their fame.” Shaftesbury's “*delenda est Carthago*”⁵ is proverbial, and his figure picturesque; in his zeal for commercial expansion, he eclipsed all others, and his fervour for the overthrow of Holland was as striking, though not as original, as his view of toleration and his methods of electioneering. Sir George Downing⁶ had

¹ Clarendon's Autobiography, ii. 3.

² Carlyle's “Cromwell,” iii. 336.

³ “Travels of Cosmo III.,” 1669 (Eng. trans. 1821), p. 469.

⁴ “Memoirs of Madame de Rémusat,” i. 170.

⁵ North's “Examen,” p. 33.

⁶ For Downing, see “Secret History of Charles II.” (1792), i. 116, ii. 84; Clarendon's Autobiography, ii. 423-6, Oldmixon, p. 562.

a far smaller mind, but the same end. Winthrop's nephew and an early student of Harvard, he had been "formerly Okey's little chaplain,"¹ says the "*Flagellum Parliamentarium*," and also Cromwell's "scout-master-general" in Scotland, but after the Restoration he became a loyal Resident at the Hague, very offensive to the Dutch, and worth forty thousand pounds. He was the chief promoter² of Parliamentary control over the appropriation of supplies, for his war policy was at least sincere, and he did not wish Charles to pay his private debts out of the public purse. Such men have little moral value, though their influence has often contributed towards that greatness of England, which is probably the happiness of the world. There is no ethical distinction in the average man of action, and if Shaftesbury had flashes of genius the other two were raised above the common ruck of capable men by good fortune alone. At all events, they were very faithful reflections of the public opinion.

When leaders are only mediocre the policy is necessarily dictated from below. In this case it was largely framed by the business men of London. Their voice was expressed in the pamphlets and oratory of the day, because no man will make money who writes

¹ "*Flagellum Parliamentarium*" (ed. 1827), p. 16.

² Clarendon's *Autobiography*, iii. 599.

above the heads of those that form his market. Alone, however, so small a class can never commit a whole nation to energetic action. The fact is, that in Charles II.'s reign their pleas appealed to a larger order of men, who were the true pillars of our maritime enterprise and of our hatred of Holland. If that great dumb body of uneducated men, who once constituted the bulk of the English population, is less clearly definable now, owing to the spread of education, it was readily identified at this time because it constituted the whole people outside a few towns. These men felt the ardour of the struggle very keenly, for patriotism has the fortunate capacity to arise even among the unintelligent. The country was ignorant and rude, but willing to fight all comers. The seafaring population¹ in particular were moved by a keen sense of wrong. Cornishmen found themselves deprived of their fishing monopoly by the Dutch, and St Ives feared its yearly catch of five thousand hogshead of pilchards would be reduced. There was no call to sympathise with Holland. Cosmopolitanism is only a vice of the over-civilised.

This strenuous public opinion must not, however, be painted in too glowing colours. The seamen of the reign did excellent work

¹ "England's Guide to Industry," p. 2.

against Algerine corsairs, ¹ "pirates and picaroons," as well as against the Dutch and French, but they were often more robust than honest. The historian, Edward Leigh, writing in 1661, puts the following speech into the mouth of the typical advocate of war: ² "My name is Dangerfield, I lye at the sign of the sword and buckler over against the Bleeding Heart in Gunpowder Alley." Privateering was more popular than fighting under the King's flag, because safer and more lucrative, and Downing ³ had to send clothes for English naval prisoners at Flushing, in order to secure them a treatment preferential to that of mere buccaneers. These free rovers of the sea loved war and upheld the anti-Dutch policy with hearty zest. Yet though Sir John Lawson, ⁴ a competent judge, thought that their depredations struck the true note of the conflict, incidents like Morgan's raid on Porto Bello were discreditable to the country, and even William Dampier was only half a hero. ⁵ Such men had little interest in genuine commerce. Like Spaniards, they wanted gold, not trade,

¹ "England's Guide to Industry," p. 315.

² Leigh, To the Reader of "Select Observations," etc. (1657).

³ Cal. State Papers, D., 1665-6, p. 207 (17th Jan. 1666).

⁴ Castlemaine's "War between England and the Dutch" (1671), p. 51.

⁵ "England's Guide to Industry," p. 93.

and they did not sympathise with the ambition to capture the eastern market or to distribute cotton goods among "the negroes or blackamoors" of Guinea and Gold Coast. When war broke out, any foreign ship was looked on as a fair prize.¹ Danish and Hansa vessels were considered indistinguishable from Dutch, and the sea was filled by English freebooters,² who plundered at will and slew at discretion.

Thus one great incentive³ to hostility to Holland was the prospect of lucrative victory. The Dutch West Indian and East Indian fleets were possible prizes in store, and the value of their cargo was priceless. A typical West Indiaman, the *Sancta Maria* of Amsterdam, looted by the English in 1664, contained 13,897 hides, 1384 cargoes of cocoa, 2225 rolls of tobacco, 772 pieces of Brazil wood and 18 kintalls of ginger. The vision of such floating El Dorados appealed to the rough sea-faring people, whom the country still reared, and who did not realise that the birth of international equity had doomed Elizabethan methods of policy and warfare. The great impetus which the reign of Charles II. gave to the British Empire was largely the work of this class. The instru-

¹ Clarendon's Autobiography, ii. 461.

² "Secret History of Charles II." (1792), ii. 121.

³ Clarendon's Autobiography, ii. 377.

ments of Providence may be blunt and yet effective.

This eagerness, and declarations like that of the inhabitants of the Isle of Wight, in which they "express great readiness to defend King and Country"¹ (a phrase which dates from the Armada year),² ought to dispel the false idea that England was dragged into her Dutch wars by her unscrupulous King and his godless court. The fact is, the royal family only swam with the stream. Charles II. owed Holland a debt of gratitude. Even since his return from exile, the Estates had presented him with a yacht,³ which he raced against one of his brother James's from Greenwich to Gravesend, and also with a bed⁴ worth eight thousand pounds, embroidered with silver and crimson velvet. Yet, apart from the promptings of his mean and callous character, Charles was naturally hostile to de Witt, whose predominance entailed the distress of the Orange party and the exclusion of his own nephew from power. His mind like his blood was half Bourbon; his crafty cynicism was even more deadly than mere English dislike, hatred of the Dutch being indeed the one active sentiment

¹ Cal. State Papers, D., 1665-6, p. 533 (14th July 1666).

² "Anglorum Speculum" (1684), p. 161.

³ Evelyn's Diary, i. 354 (1st Oct. 1661).

⁴ *Ibid.*, i. 364 (9th June 1661).

which broke the even tenour of his contempt for humanity. His promise¹ to make the Bible "the rule of my life and reign" had been given merely to soothe Dissenters. James,² Duke of York, was at one with Charles; his heart was set upon war. The Dutch Estates had not mollified his dislike by giving him³ "two very fine chests covered with gold and Indian varnish." He revolted at their religion and their Republicanism; he was genuinely interested in the navy, and felt the stimulating effects of such dedications as—

"The world of your atchievements is afraid,
While Neptune's watery kingdom you invade." ⁴

He was not a cool thinker, and the idea of war inflamed him. Cosmo de' Medici⁵ saw him dining once at Sheerness; "every time his Highness drank, the discharge of cannon was repeated."

The point then to remember is that public opinion as to the Dutch was a natural outcome of English conditions, and that the

¹ Dedicatory Epistle to "Leigh's Choice Observations of all the Kings" (1661).

² "Secret History of Charles II." (1792), ii. 73; Clarendon's Autobiography, ii. 379.

³ Pepys' Diary, p. 70 (20th April 1661).

⁴ From the Dedication of "The Dutch Usurpation" (1672).

⁵ "Travels of Cosmo III." (1669), p. 386.

war which it created was not a "King's war," or one man's work. One good proof of this lies in the general disappointment¹ which followed the settlement of 1660. The joy which had been so unutterable, was dead in 1664. The first enthusiasm had been too great to last. "I stood in the Strand and beheld it, and blessed God."² Englishmen had felt relieved indeed when a maypole rose again in London, when the heads of regicides were transfixed on London Bridge, and when Hyde Park was filled once more by "an immense appearance of gallants and rich coaches."³ The world had then seemed very rose-coloured, and Evelyn was displeased with Hamlet.⁴ "The old plays began to disgust this refined age since his Majesty's being so long abroad."

Yet long before the popular rage against Holland reached its height, this artificial rapture had come to an end. Royalists were disgusted with the small rewards of loyalty, and Presbyterians with the indelicate intolerance of the government.⁵ Clarendon had offended all men. What generous measures could possibly be expected from

¹ Clarendon's Autobiography, ii. 13.

² Evelyn's Diary, i. 337 (29th May 1660).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 351 (1st May 1661).

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 358 (26th Nov. 1661).

⁵ Clarendon's Autobiography, ii. 3; Pepys' Diary, p. 107 (1st July 1662).

a minister who refused the gift of a Bible because it did not include the Apocrypha?¹ Even the Portuguese marriage was not welcomed, because Bombay and Tangier were all but unknown, and the Queen² was not fascinating with her "six frights who called themselves maids of honour."³ The average man is unimaginative, and he judged Catherine's nation by her plain attendants "in monstrous fardingales,"⁴ and by her obnoxious Catholic priests.⁵ The sale of Dunkirk at the close of 1662 was at least a moral blunder, and cost the government what popularity it still retained.

The truth is, that the Dutch war was caused by English public opinion alone, and not by the inclinations of Charles II. nor the wiles of Louis XIV. The strength of popular sentiment has been seen already; it remains to examine with what force the official vindication appealed "to God, Angels, and Men to judge between us." This pamphlet was entitled a ⁶ "Catalogue of the Damages for which the English

¹ A. Clark's "Lincoln" (1898), p. 137.

² Clarendon's Autobiography, i. 317 *seq.*

³ Hamilton's "Memoirs of Count Grammont" (ed. 1876), p. 102.

⁴ Evelyn's Diary, i. 363 (30th May 1662).

⁵ Pepys' Diary, p. 101 (25th April 1662).

⁶ Printed for Henry Broome at the Gun in Ivy Lane (1664).

demand reparation from the United Netherlands." It chronicles a long list of affronts offered to English subjects by Dutchmen in all parts of the world—Cape Corse, Comenda, Stralsund, Leghorn, Smyrna, Angola, St Vincent, Calbarine. The re-criminatory answer of the Estates is appended. Nothing better illustrates the depth of the mutual hatred, and the inevitable nature of the wars that followed.

The English grievances are stated very effectively. The Dutch East India Company¹ is alleged to have inflicted injustice upon British East Indiamen. Trade has been forbidden in putative Dutch preserves, and pepper has been stolen from ships at Bantam. An English store has been raided at Jambee in Sumatra, and the *Merchant of Constantinople* has been stripped of arms off Goa. The Dutch West India Company² has shown the same jealousy of English competitors. They have burnt the factory at Cape Corse twice—in May 1659, and again in May 1661. Two English Turkey Company's ships have been pillaged by the *Holy Mary*. Moreover, Dutch depredations have often been official. Opdam,³ the Dutch Vice-Admiral, himself seized one hundred and ten lasts of rye,

¹ "Catalogue of Damages" (1664), pp. 1-3.

² *Ibid.*, p. 4 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

which the *Golden Sun of Lübeck* had shipped at Revel. Men-of-war¹ captured the *Dove* of London near the Shetlands, and the *Rebecca* of Ipswich in the North Sea. Furthermore, Poleroon was not yet delivered into English hands, in spite of the promise² given by the Netherlands in the treaty of 4th September (O.S.) 1662. In any case, the destruction of the clove trees on the island rendered it valueless³ for many years to come.

The Dutch excuses and counter-charges were made in a similar implacable spirit, and the writer of this pamphlet treated them with scorn. Of course, some of them were idle. Love of a "closed door" was much more the cause of Dutch oppression of English traders than any alleged help given by Charles II.'s subjects to Moors,⁴ Indians,⁵ and the people of Cochin. On the other hand, Holland might well complain of high-handed acts done by Englishmen in every corner of the globe. Dutch ships had been driven by stress of weather into Arundel and Weymouth, only to be robbed of every particle of cordage and rigging, of every trifle of use, down to the very bolts and nails.

¹ "Catalogue of Damages" (1664), p. 13.

² *Ibid.*, p. 18.

³ It was so as late as 1683—"England's Guide to Industry," p. 163.

⁴ "Catalogue," p. 23.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

One herring-bark had been boarded, "in a frolic," by an English captain, who took her off to Yarmouth. Dutch whalers had been excluded from Greenland, and the *Prince William* despoiled of her shallops, lines, nets and harpoons—her oars, foregangers, sails, hatchets and slitting-knife, besides twenty florins in money, four cheeses, two barrels of brandy, and a bag of groats. Their slavers were interfered with, and forced ransoms, extorted by English freebooters, were interpreted as voluntary gifts by the Jamaica courts of justice. Freeborn,¹ a notorious pirate, had preyed on Dutch ships off Cuba, but was acquitted in England by reason of an alleged want of prosecution.² The *Surat Merchant*³ forced a Moorish vessel to strike two Dutch flags, which it carried, in the road of Gameron.

English public opinion demanded war. Pamphlets such as this last one were only trivial details in bringing it about. The immediate cause of a conflict is often immaterial, and the two nations would have fought whether Sir Robert Holmes had sailed to Guinea or not in the summer of 1664, taken a Dutch post at Cape Verde, which he rechristened "James,"⁴ and another in Gambia, which he renamed "Charles

¹ "Catalogue," p. 36. ² *Ibid.*, p. 37. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

⁴ "Description exacte," etc. (Amsterdam, 1668), p. 17.

Island." The king took such news very lightly, and asked Sir George Carteret¹ laughingly how he was to explain them to the Estates. He looked forward gaily to the spoils of war, for he was always in need of money, and would have bestowed knight-hood on "the whole city and suburbs for a very small spill of the ready"² (*i.e.* cash). There was therefore nothing to create surprise in his sending Coventry to Sweden, Sir Walter Vane to Brandenburg, and Sir Gilbert Talbot ("a great cheat at bowls and cards," says the "*Flagellum*"³) to Denmark to find allies against Holland. Such proceedings were sanctioned by the deliberate temper of the country. Patriotism and the desire of gain are at the bottom of all forms of Imperialism in varying proportions, and both were active in 1664. "The Dutch poison is at last burst out against England; this cocatrice egg 'tis hoped will quickly be crushed,"⁴ wrote one impassioned zealot ten years earlier, and the Restoration had in no way assuaged the national ambition "to beat them out all their trade they have in Christendom."⁵ Holland had been described by Marvell as "but the off-scouring of the

¹ Pepys' Diary, p. 220 (29th Sept. 1664).

² Misson's "Memoirs and Observations in his Travels in England" (Ozell's trans., 1719), p. 168.

³ "*Flagellum Parliamentarium*" (ed. 1827), p. 7.

⁴ "The Sea's Magazine Opened," etc. (London, 1653), Preface.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

British sand," and in the whirl of popular excitement the evils of war were forgotten. "Our ships," "our trade," "our seas," were phrases in everybody's mouth, and, except as to the Dutch Indies, "mare liberum" was to Englishmen anathema.

If the insobriety of opinion seems ill-judged to a critic of emotions, he will at least recognise that it was comparatively devoid of cant. The Commonwealth had waged war for the same end with less candour. It had asserted that the Dutch "gave as 'tis said of Nephtali, fair and goodly words but war was in their hearts; they spake by their ambassadors peace, but as the Prophet David saith, they then made them ready to battle."¹ The disputants who championed public opinion in 1664 were destitute of such Biblical phraseology. They realised in a rude way that even if the stakes in the war were very glorious, it was yet unseemly for either party to boast too much of "God's holy assistance"² in so selfish a strife. On the other hand, it has often been invoked by worse men and for worse causes.

¹ "The Sea's Magazine Opened" (1653), Preface.

² *Ibid.*, p. 18.

CHAPTER II

PUBLIC OPINION DURING THE WAR (1665-1668)

BEFORE turning to the history of public opinion between 1665 and 1668, it is necessary to go briefly over the events of the first Dutch war.¹ War was formally declared in March 1665. It had already raged nine months. De Ruyter had amply avenged Holmes's raid on the African coast in October 1664, but meanwhile the Dutch had lost their American colonies,² for, on 8th September, six columns of thirty men each under Nicholls had marched triumphantly into New Amsterdam, which

¹ Authorities for the war: "Secret History of Charles II." (1792), ii. 137-320; "Description exacte de tout ce qui s'est passé," etc. (Amsterdam, 1668); Clarendon's Autobiography, ii. 423 *sq.*; Oldmixon's "England Under the Stuarts," pp. 521-570; Ludlow's "Memoirs," ii. 376-410; The Earl of Castlemaine's "War Between England and the Dutch": (in the Savoy, 1671); Calendar of State Papers, 1664-7; Pepys' Diary; Evelyn's Diary.

² O'Callaghan's "History of New Netherlands" (1843), p. 536.

was henceforward New York. Fort Orange became Albany, and Flushing, Newark.

The first great fight in Europe took place on 3rd June (O.S.) 1665. The Dutch lost eighteen ships¹ and 2000 men, including Opdam and two other admirals. The English loss was between 500 and 800² and only one ship. Sandwich was less successful in an attempt to capture the Dutch East Indiamen in Bergen harbour. However, in September he took fourteen vessels, four of them men-of-war—

“Which as a tribute from the Baltic Sea
The British ocean sent her mighty lord.”³

On 2nd June (O.S.) 1666, Albemarle began a long sea-fight against De Ruyter, which lasted three days. Rupert arrived in time to save a collapse of the English fleet. As it was, the loss was very heavy; at least ten ships were lost (perhaps twenty-three) and one admiral, six captains and six hundred men were killed. The prisoners numbered between two and four thousand.⁴ The

¹ Clarendon's *Autobiography*, ii. 507; Castlemaine says twenty (p. 11); “*Secret History*” (p. 146)—eighteen.

² Castlemaine says 500 (p. 12); Pepys, “not above 700” (*Diary*, p. 243, 8th June 1665), and the Dutch “*Description exacte*,” etc., says 800.

³ Dryden's “*Annus Mirabilis*,” 1666.

⁴ “*Description exacte*,” etc. (Amsterdam, 1668), says 4,000 (p. 141); Evelyn says 2,000 (ii. 6).

Dutch lost four ships and from seven to eight hundred men.¹ The balance of success was restored by English victories in July, and Holmes burnt Brandaris in August, and Schelling in September, the last place being "famous for the many sea-dogs that come basking in the sunshine upon the sea-shores."

By this time Louis XIV. had joined the Dutch (January 1666), rather than allow England to obtain decisive maritime supremacy. On 18th September 1666, Allin took the *Ruby*,² "one of the primest ships" in the French navy. England, however, had just experienced the fire of London, which completed the demoralisation caused by the plague of 1665. Consequently the government availed themselves of negotiations to abandon offensive warfare. There was, in fact, no money to maintain it.³ The plague still reduced customs and excise to nothing, while the destruction of London by fire prevented a successful imposition of chimney-money. The warships were accordingly brought into docks, and it was hoped that the

¹ The Dutch "Description" and Castlemaine both say four ships. Some English accounts say fifteen or eighteen.

² Castlemaine's "War between England and the Dutch" (1671), p. 48; cf. Pepys' Diary, p. 335 (2nd Nov. 1666).

³ Clarendon's Autobiography, iii. 695-6.

forts at Sheerness, Tilbury, Hull, Plymouth, and Portsmouth, would be adequate safeguards against any possible invaders. Peace was obviously at hand and it was prematurely welcomed. Hitherto the land defences had been sacrificed to the needs of an aggressive navy. The result was the disaster of June 1667, when de Ruyter sailed up the Medway and afterwards raided the east coast without any effectual resistance, although one eyewitness did indeed see¹ "much firing of the militia from Filstow Cliff." Berry and Harman redeemed the disgrace to some extent by successes in the West Indies, and the Peace of Breda (July 1667) was inconclusive. The French retained Acadia, but restored St Christopher and Antigua. The Dutch kept Surinam as well as Poleroon; the English retained New York and New Jersey. The Navigation Act was modified; the salute to the flag in British waters allowed as a matter of courtesy. This was, in fact, but an armistice due to accidents which "would have crackt the back of any place but England."² Acadia came back from France to England

¹ Cal. State Papers, D., 1667, p. 258 (2nd July 1667).

² Castlemaine's "War between England and the Dutch" (1671), p. 42.

within half a century, and the one lasting loss was Surinam, the modern Dutch Guiana.

If the war itself was disappointing in its results, the various aspects of national feeling during its continuance are interesting. Amid many blunders, the dogged persistence of national opinion was a splendid proof that the England of Charles II. was in many ways admirable and great. Her people were so zealous to win the struggle that they bore its burden with equanimity, and faced emergencies with a light heart. In June 1665, Bigorre¹ wrote home to describe London's rejoicings over the defeat of Opdam, telling how captured Dutch flags were floating on the top of the Tower, how the bells of Westminster were ringing, and how the windows of foreign envoys were broken. In July 1666 Bennet² wrote rapturously to Orrery of civic bonfires and bells. The Chapel Royal produced a constant succession of thanksgiving anthems, which were nearer cantatas³ in character, as they were especially designed to please the King's brisk and airy taste. Even after de

¹ Jusserand's "French Ambassador at Court of Charles II." (1892), p. 147.

² Bennet to Orrery, 31st July 1666 (in "Miscellanea Aulica," 1702, p. 412).

³ Grove's "Dictionary of Music," iii. 283.

Ruyter's raid, after the plague and the fire, Londoners could still celebrate May Day, 1667. Pepys¹ saw "many milk-maids with their garlands upon their pails, dancing with a fiddler before them, and pretty Nelly standing at her lodgings door in Drury Lane in her smock sleeves and bodice looking upon one; she seemed a mighty pretty creature."

The general view of the conduct of the war was half delight and half dismay. Its two chief features were valour and incapacity. There is no doubt that the first was appreciated. There must have been some shining qualities in public opinion to evoke so large an amount of enthusiasm and self-sacrifice. In the engagement of 3rd to 13th June 1665, the Duke of York owed his life to Captain Jeremy Smith of the *Mary*, who with a loss of ninety-nine men² captured the *Maurice*, and killed two hundred of her crew. When Tedderman tried to capture the Dutch fleet in the impregnable harbour at Bergen with only twenty-four ships, he showed the old English pluck, and deserved a couplet in Dryden's "Annus Mirabilis." The great battle of June 1666 was nobly

¹ Pepys' Diary, p. 385 (1st May 1667).

² *Ibid.*, p. 242 (3rd June 1665).

fought. De Witt¹ told Temple in after days that it gave England more glory than many victories. Evelyn² saw the fleet trailing back to the Nore, shattered but glorious, looking "rather like so many wrecks and hulls" than men-of-war. Even the cynical King was moved to admiration when told the story of the fight by a wounded seaman³ "all muffled up and his face as black as the chimney and covered with dirt, pitch and tar, and powder, and muffled with dirty clouts, and his right eye stopped with okum." After the disasters of 1667 one French fleet was beaten off Nevis and another off Martinique.

The war attracted every class equally. A great number of courtiers, with most of the soldierly qualities except capacity, filled the Duke of York's fleet in 1665—Falmouth, Rochester, Sackville, Cavendish, Ferrers, Dutens, Clifford, whose bravery was at all events more distinguished than were their minds. Certainly they fought and died for the cause of Empire. On the night before the battle of Lowestoft, Charles Sackville, Earl of Dorset, wrote these spirited lines to "all ye ladies now at land":

¹ Temple's "Observations upon the Netherlands" (1693), p. 256.

² Evelyn's Diary, ii. 27 (17th June 1666).

³ Pepys' Diary, p. 290 (4th June 1666).

“Should foggy Opdam chance to know
Our sad and dismal story,
The Dutch would scorn so weak a foe
And quit their fort at Goree.
For what resistance can they find
From men who’ve left their hearts behind?
With a fa la la la.”

Next morning, the Earl of Falmouth, Lord Muskery, and a son of the Earl of Burlington were killed by one shot on the Duke’s quarter-deck, while on Prince Rupert’s ship died the Earls of Marlborough and Portland. Such men had many failings; they had no training and no discipline, and Albemarle¹ often thought them laggards, but in the main they upheld the good traditions of their class.

There was, however, no genius in the navy. Its leaders had in several cases risen from a humble station by merit alone, but they had no talent for organisation, and indeed little opportunity. Still they were, in their way, great men. Sir John Lawson was “a perfect tarpawlin,”² and had risen from being a Scarborough cabin-boy³ to be admiral of a squadron. Sir Christopher

¹ Pepys’ Diary, p. 292 (7th June 1666).

² Clarendon’s Autobiography, ii. 478.

³ *Ibid.*, ii. 509; Braybrook’s notes to Pepys describe Lawson as “the son of a poor man at Hull.”

Mings¹ was the son of a shoemaker. Death in action closed a hundred such careers. Lawson himself was wounded on the knee at Lowestoft, and died of blood-poisoning a few weeks later at Greenwich. Mings was mortally wounded a year later. ² "About a dozen able, lusty, proper men" gathered at his grave, and swore to "show our memory of our dead commander, and our revenge." Perhaps the cleverest admiral was Edward Montagu, Earl of Sandwich, but he lost his position by appropriating some of the spoils of his East India prizes, and he was sent instead into the diplomatic service. The next war gave him more glory, and a soldier's death. Captain Douglas³ chose to go down in the *Royal Oak* rather than leave his post without orders.

If, however, there were some things to gratify public expectation, there were more to disappoint them. This was the first English war which was thoroughly understood by the whole people; it was of their own making. Consequently the conduct of the administration was, for the first time, exposed to the popular gaze, and it therefore provoked widespread dissatisfaction. The

¹ Pepys' Diary, p. 265 (26th Aug. 1665).

² *Ibid.*, p. 295 (13th June 1666).

³ Cobbett's "Parliamentary History," iv. 362.

Navy Commissioners were unequal to the constant strain. One embezzler of stores¹ pleaded in his defence "that he could not maintain himself and family without practising such shifts." Supplies drifted off to court favourites, and men starved and ships rotted. In 1663 already, spinners² had mutinied in Portsmouth ropeyard, and gunners on the wharf. In 1666 there was a strike among the Chatham ropemakers,³ and a few years later all the pressed "calkers"⁴ deserted from Woolwich. Pay was always in arrear, and twenty shillings had to be spent on drinks⁵ to reconcile men pressed at Lynn to the conditions of the Service. No wonder that Parliament asked what was the good of the vaunted "great proviso,"⁶ which gave it the right to control appropriation of supply, and that the Commons "did fall foul of our accounts."⁷

The management of the Navy was, in fact, hopeless—"bad from top to bottom,"⁸

¹ Clarendon's Autobiography, ii. 458.

² Cal. State Papers, D., 1662-3, p. 263 (1st and 23rd Sept. 1663).

³ *Ibid.*, 1665-6, p. 474 (29th June 1666).

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1670, p. 319 (5th July 1670).

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1665-6, p. 529 (13th July 1666).

⁶ Pepys' Diary, p. 345 (8th Dec. 1666).

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 338 (10th Nov. 1666).

Ibid., p. 293 (10th June 1666).

said Carteret to Pepys. There was continual jealousy¹ between the Duke of York's friends and those of Albemarle. The one party supported Holmes, the other Smith. In June 1666, all the seven great guns² specially made for the *Loyall London* exploded at their first trial. In October 1666, the Navy Board³ wanted at least fifty thousand pounds to put a fleet to sea. In May 1667, Commissioner Pett⁴ was found to have given Navy contracts to himself under another name. Prize money was embezzled by Minnes, the incapable Comptroller of the Navy, and by Brounker,⁵ an official of the Duke of York's bedchamber, responsible for the escape of the Dutch fleet after the action off Lowestoft. He was the rake who discovered Sarah Jennings' exploit as an orange girl—"a very honest man," says Hamilton, and "the best chess-player in England." Less notorious characters set just as pernicious an example. A government pay-chest was broken into at Chatham by the boat's crew of Sir Fretchville

¹ Pepys' Diary, p. 304 (21st July 1666).

² *Ibid.*, p. 299 (26th June 1666).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 329 (7th Oct. 1666).

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 391 (22nd May 1667).

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 442; "Secret History of Charles II." ii. 150 and 375; Clarendon's Autobiography, ii. 513-5.

Hollis,¹ "who used to brag so much of the goodness and order of his men."

The policy which brought about the Dutch success in June 1667 was a familiar English method, which detracts from the practical worth of the national opinion. The army had been sacrificed to the fleet, and land defences entirely neglected. When Cosmo de' Medici visited Plymouth in 1669, he described its garrison of a hundred and fifty men as being² "very handsome and in erect order, four companies wearing red jackets lined with yellow, and that of the Duke, yellow with red lining," but, he added that the fort had been stripped of brass guns³ for the sake of the fleet. The country was as responsible for this policy as either King or court. It feared a standing army, and did not agitate for reform when, on one occasion, "not ten guards" would obey Lord Gerard, their commander, although "all related to loyal families."⁴ Accordingly, when the Government laid up their ships in the interest of economy, there was no second line of defence. Albe-

¹ Pepys' Diary, 411 (30th June 1667).

² "Travels of Cosmo III.," p. 123.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

⁴ Cal. State Papers, D., 1665-6, p. 477 (30th June 1666).

marle¹ found only a dozen distracted sailors in Chatham dockyard in June 1667. Spragge could not defend Sheerness. The Dutch "with their cannon beat all the works flat." The seamen themselves no longer had any wish to fight; no pay no service. "This comes of your not paying our husbands,"² was the cry of Wapping women, and sailors told Pepys³ they would join the Dutch unless they were saved from starvation. When the enemy⁴ took the *Royal Charles*, it was absolutely deserted; the greatest battleship in the world was a prey to nine men in a small boat.

The one great flaw in English public opinion during the first Dutch war was, therefore, its inability to find good men for high places. Men like Lawson and Mings and John Berry, once boatswain of the *Swallow* ketch, and afterwards the hero of Nevis, were quite exceptional. The usual leader in action was of a poorer type. While part of the stern of the *Royal Charles* with its emblazoned royal arms was being carried away to Helvoetsluys,

¹ Cobbett's "Parliamentary History," iv. 405 (ed. 1808).

² Pepys' Diary, p. 400 (14th June 1667).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 401 (same date).

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 405 (22nd June 1667).

Pepys found Albemarle at Gravesend "with a great many idle lords and gentlemen with their pistols and fooleries."¹ The greatness of the national aims and the bravery of the men who did the fighting were alike neutralised by the want of able organisers of victory. Parliament had no business capacity at all; barely thirty members² belonged to the mercantile class. The years preceding the war were eloquent of healthy ambitions. In spite of moral deficiencies, English policy was full of hope and reason. The war proved that its high aims were quite impracticable if the means to gain them were entrusted to the men then in office. The "Flagellum Parliamentarium," an anonymous libel of the time, reveals its dissatisfaction. Over a hundred and fifty members of Parliament³ are branded as scoundrels. Sir John Bennet (Arlington's brother) is alleged to have won the positions of Postmaster, Prize Officer, and Lieutenant of Gentlemen Pensioners, by means of money obtained when "he cheated the poor indigent officers." Sir Jonathan Trelawney⁴ bought the place

¹ Pepys' Diary, p. 396 (10th June 1667).

² *Ibid.*, p. 203 (23rd March 1664).

³ "Flagellum Parliamentarium," p. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

of comptroller to the Duke of York by profits taken as "a forsworne cheate in the Prize Office." The men who won England's battles were in the main distinct from those who won the booty. Sir Francis Clerke¹ paid £600 to become "a cheating commissioner of the Prize Office." Sir Stephen Fox² embezzled £100,000 as paymaster of the guards. Sir W. Doyley³ is said to have appropriated £7000 out of the allowance made for the care of Dutch prisoners, "by which some thousands of them were starved." Sir William Penn⁴ was impeached for breaking bulk and seizing £115,000 prize money.

Of course, this general denunciation is too sweeping. Fox was, no doubt, "one of the richest men in England,"⁵ but his wealth was thought by another writer to have been "honestly gotten and unenvied."⁶ Still there was much to condemn in the average politician, who first fostered the national enthusiasm, and then frittered it away in a war that failed. The country was not indeed unduly despondent. It looked forward to a renewal

¹ "Flagellum Parliamentarium," p. 11.

² *Ibid.*, p. 24.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁴ Cobbett's "Parliamentary History," iv. 410.

⁵ Hamilton's "Memoirs of Count Grammont," p. 228.

⁶ Evelyn's Diary (6th Sept. 1680).

of the struggle with cheerfulness and composure. When some men thought regretfully of the ease of Cromwell's success against the Dutch,¹ Bethel² blamed the Protector for having ever made peace with them. It will be seen how little the struggle affected the tone of public opinion, and how the pamphlets of 1670-3 are but repetitions of those of 1660-4.

The best feature of the conduct of the war was its humanity. The national hatred of the enemy was so personal and so bitter that it is refreshing to see how chivalrously many of the English seamen respected unfortunate foes. There were naturally exceptions. The type of soldier represented by the ferocious Colonel Kirke was still somewhat common. One foreign account³ describes how in the first great sea fight of the war, an English ship allowed the crew of a sunken Dutch vessel to drown, and cried, "You rogues! You fellows, you must be killed." The English conquerors of New Amsterdam and New Jersey have also been reproached⁴ for

¹ Pepys' Diary, p. 415 (12th July 1667).

² "The World's Mistake in Oliver Cromwell" (1668), p. 3.

³ "Description de tout ce qui s'est passé dans les guerres," etc. (Amsterdam, 1668), p. 55.

⁴ O'Callaghan's "New Netherlands" (1843), pp. 537 and 542.

cruelty with some justice. However, as a rule the gentler spirit reigned. When Evertsen¹ was captured after a brave fight, Charles II. released him in recognition of his gallantry. When Evelyn visited Dutch prisoners at Chelsea, "they only complained that their bread was too fine."² The enemy were as clement, and behaved with far more moderation³ in Kent, than Holmes did at Schelling. A committee,⁴ which included Clifford and Evelyn, had care of the widows and children of men who fell in action, and seem to have done good work. Assuredly there was a great field for charity. In the victory off Lowestoft the deaths on one ship alone (the London frigate) made fifty widows,⁵ of whom forty-five had children. During 1665 and 1666, England must have lost over ten thousand able-bodied men in action or from wounds, besides between sixty and one hundred thousand victims of the plague. It says much for the people that their minds could rise above their distress, and continue the great work of commercial progress and colonial expansion. They did so without

¹ Evelyn's Diary, i. 398 (24th April 1665).

² *Ibid.*, i. 389 (8th Feb. 1665).

³ Pepys' Diary, p. 411 (30th June 1667).

⁴ Evelyn's Diary, i. 385 (27th Oct. 1664).

⁵ *Ibid.*, i. 393 (16th May 1665).

neglecting the dictates of a growing sense of responsibility for the weak, for infirmaries and asylums were being generously built. Bedlam,¹ or Bethlem was opened for lunatics in 1675. The witty Misson,² reflected that "all the mad folks of London are not in this hospital." In King's time, £165,000³ was spent yearly on hospitals and alms-houses, but the immense numbers of those who received charity directly or indirectly—no less than 930,000⁴ in 1696—show how hard life was in seventeenth-century England, and how no forward step in a nation's evolution can be made without blood and sorrow. The uproar⁵ in every parish on the arrival of a stranger or marriage of an inhabitant, showed how a bad Poor Law can ruin a people. According to a disinterested witness, the poor were "hunted like foxes out of parishes."⁶

¹ Misson's "Memoirs and Observations," p. 16.

² *Ibid.*, p. 17.

³ Gregory King's "Observations upon State of England," p. 72.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁵ "Britannia Languens," p. 155.

⁶ Cobbett's "Parliamentary History," iv. 679.

CHAPTER III

THE ENGLISH VIEW OF THE DUTCH (1668-1674).

THE English politician of 1668 did not peer into the future. He judged politics by what he saw. Consequently he still regarded the Dutch as his chief enemies—the principal obstacle to the path of maritime supremacy. From France he feared nothing. When Louis XIV. invaded the Spanish Netherlands in 1667, and when Turenne and Condé conquered half of Flanders and all Franche Comté, he was still indifferent. The treaty of Breda was followed by Sir William Temple's Triple Alliance¹ between England, Holland and Sweden (January 1668), but neither this nor the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (May 1668) evoked any general pleasure in Great Britain. The country would as soon have seen France triumph over Holland as Holland over

¹ For which see the so-called "Perpetual League of Mutual Defence and Alliance between His Majesty and the States General," etc. (1668).

France. The one was her great trade rival ; the other only a Catholic kingdom without further obnoxious attributes.

Charles II. therefore found it easy to throw over the Dutch allies. As soon as Louis XIV. promised him money and support, he broke faith with de Witt and concluded the secret treaty of Dover (May 1670.) The government was docile, for Buckingham, the chief supplanter of Clarendon, preferred frivolity to business. Temple was recalled in September 1670, and Louise de Quérouaille came to England to win power in the State, and a place in the peerage. The prospect of a war with France and England was ominous for the Netherlands, and spelt the ruin of de Witt, who had never imagined that Colbert's mercantile ambition was even greater than his own and far more militant. War must needs bring the fighting classes to the front in the United Provinces — the Calvinists of the rural districts, all Orange partisans and haters of the Amsterdam burghers as friends of the French.

In a measure England played into the hands of Louis XIV. She helped to destroy the power of the Dutch ; when she deserted them she "broke their hearts."¹ Temple

¹ Temple's "Observations upon the Netherlands," p. 272.

knew this and was sorry. Most men rejoiced, for if the English share in the war of 1672-4 paved the way for further French aggrandisement, it also cleared the road for the advancement of the British Empire. The country never appreciated the vaunted "triple bond," nor acknowledged that the breaking of it "fitted Israel for a foreign yoke."¹ No one will pretend that Clifford's repudiation of it was dictated by any exalted motive, but in the interest of the Empire

"All loyal English will like him conclude,
Let Caesar live and Carthage be subdued."

These lines from the prologue to Dryden's "Amboyna" (1673) are typical of the whole war spirit of the day. It was very simple, almost crude. Shaftesbury deemed Holland our "eternal enemy, both by interest and inclination."²

Only one pamphlet of the time—the "Present Interest of England"³ (1671)—looked on the Dutch as our "outworks,"⁴ and our proper allies against French tyranny and Popery. The more popular view was

¹ Dryden's "Absalom and Achitophel," Part I., 1681.

² "Collection of Parliamentary Debates," i. 39 (ed. 1739).

³ "Present Interest of England, stated by a Lover of his King and Country" (London, 1671).

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

that French success against Holland would have no more effect on us than the conquest of Granada.¹ The fact is that the religious aspect of the question never struck Englishmen until the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Louis XIV. was not yet a devotee, or, as Napoleon² put it, the tool of "priests and an old woman." French policy was secular.³ "The itch of propagating opinions . . . is quite out of fashion in Christendom, and I believe nobody thinks that France, in its intentions of conquering us, ever thought of the Church." Downing, the leading foe of the Netherlands, had once been the persecutor of Naylor, and the champion of the Vaudois.

The opinion of this period was therefore merely a repetition of the old jealousy against Holland, with the added incentive of a wish for vengeance. Already, in March 1668,⁴ the *Charles* had been launched at Deptford dock, and the animosity of a large class was so bitter as to be "not becoming Christian neighbours"⁵ according to Evelyn. The literary assailants of the Dutch were as eager as the men of action.

¹ "Letter to Sir Thomas Osborn" (1672), p. 11.

² "Memoirs of Madame de Rémusat," i. 202.

³ "Two Letters," etc. (1673), p. 9.

⁴ Evelyn's Diary, ii. 32 (3rd March 1668).

⁵ *Ibid.*, ii. 69 (12th March 1672).

A ¹ "Letter to Sir Thomas Osborn" (1672) denounces the imaginary alliance with de Witt, on the ground that we cannot be "peace-makers-general without any consideration." The writer did not know that his own Government had already broken faith two years before. The commercial classes were stirred up by the same methods which had roused them in 1664. "The Dutch Usurpation" ² (1672) recalls many "cruelties and injustices" ³ since the date of the Amboyna massacre, and appeals to mercantile jealousy. ⁴ "Consult the Muscovia and Turkey Companies; enquire at the exchange; they will tell you it (trade)'s gone, whither I know not but into Amsterdam."

As bitter a publication is a work called "Two Letters, the one from a Dutchman to his correspondent in England; the other in answer" (1673). The Dutch are therein described as being worse than the Turks, ⁵ and utterly faithless. Pamphleteers like the author of this tract were exactly fitted for their task, and had just the right amount of

¹ "Letter to Sir Thomas Osborn," etc. (London, 1672), pp. 9-10.

² "By William de Britaine" (London, 1672).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁵ "Two Letters," etc., p. 20.

capacity to win adherents. They had their own rough and ready version of Dutch politics, more vulgar, but no less shrewd than Temple's own able and friendly "Observations upon the United Provinces" (1672). They had nothing in common with that master of premature idealism and statesmanship, but tried to play the game of "Divide et Impera"¹ in the Netherlands. Charles himself declared that he waged war only on "the Louvestein faction."²

What Englishmen did not realise was that the Dutch had a greater and more vital struggle before them than a mere war of trade, and so their endeavours to pit the Orange party against de Witt failed to bring about the desired end. Charles II.'s nephew, William of Orange, had a soul above mere dynastic considerations, and applied his motto of "*Je maintiendrai*" to a wider field than family pretensions. De Witt's faction was indeed bound to fall because it was composed only of burghers, and as he said himself,³ "a cat may be like a lion but remains always a cat; so we are Dutch merchants who cannot be changed into warriors." Yet

¹ *E.g.* in "The Dutch Remonstrance concerning the proceedings and practices of John de Witt" (Hague and London, 1672).

² Ludlow's "Memoirs," ii. 435.

³ "Memoirs of Jean de Witt" (Hague, 1709) p. 171.

the triumph of the House of Orange in August 1672 only supplanted de Witt by a man as patriotic as he, and more successful.

If England lacked insight she did not lack audacity. No war began more unscrupulously than the second Dutch conflict. Holmes with five frigates (the Dutch¹ account says sixteen) attacked the Smyrna fleet. It was still in time of peace, and the convoy had the protection of some five, six, or eight Dutch warships. Arlington, the minister who suggested this feat,² afterwards wrote to Gascoyn that "the truth is they believed them merchants, whom they found to be stout men of war, by which means Sir Robert Holmes and he (Ossory) had like to have taken a Tartar."³ Two ships only were captured. (March, 1672).

Downing meanwhile did his best to hasten war at home. "His manners were as rude as those of an Iroquois,"⁴ and he "made a great noise in the Hague,"⁵ between 8th January and 4th February 1672.⁶ It

¹ "The Netherland Historian" (Amsterdam, 1675), p. 8. This is by far the best history of the war.

² "Collection of Parliamentary Debates," i. 58.

³ Arlington to Gascoyn, 19th March 1672 (in "Misc. Aulica," 1702, p. 66).

⁴ Oldmixon, p. 562.

⁵ "Answer of the States General to Declaration of War" (Hague, 1674), p. 7.

⁶ "The Netherland Historian," p. 2.

was in vain to try to persuade such men that the Dutch were willing to meet all their claims fairly. The British interest was war; a struggle between France and Holland would give a rare opportunity to English traders. Accordingly the official statement of grievances was not very plausible.

A yacht¹ called the *Merlin*, had been sent under Captain Crow to fetch Lady Temple home, with instructions to run through the Dutch fleet. "Making a bravado,"² the little ship called on the men-of-war to lower their topsails and strike their flags.³ Van Ghent showed great self-control, for when Crow "shot twice upon him," he explained the impossibility of such a concession "with all imaginable civility," although his tackle had been torn by the volleys.⁴ This incident was hardly worth fighting about, and English complaints as to sundry Dutch medals and broadsides were purely trivial.⁵ If a sheriff of Dort had blazing ships as a background for a picture of de Witt or de Ruyter, it was not a *casus belli*.

¹ "The Netherland Historian," p. 2.

² *Ibid.*, p. 2.

³ "Answer of the States General," p. 26.

⁴ Ludlow's "Memoirs," ii. 426.

⁵ "Answer, etc.," p. 19.

The English people, however, were resolved to effect the work they had started in 1664. A new fort had been built at Tilbury.¹ Charles, who had already made a "sea progress" in the autumn of 1671, now promised to go with the Queen to inspect the navy in person,² and so do something to atone for any want of men or deficiency in ammunition. Lockhart was sent to Brandenburg to raise allies "for the mortification of Holland."³ The country was again enthusiastic. The courage of seamen was given an artificial stimulus by a law⁴ penalising the surrender of ships to pirates, and the category of pirates was not confined to Turks.

The Dutch had been oppressive to the English settlers dispossessed of Surinam, and public opinion was again fanned by masters of the art of agitation. Albemarle had died in January 1670, but Shaftesbury became an earl in April 1672, and was President of the Council of Trade and Plantations between September 1672 and April 1676. Deeply interested in the Bahamas⁵ and

¹ Evelyn's Diary, ii. 71 (21st March 1672).

² Arlington to Gascoyn, 19th April 1672 ("Misc. Aulica," 1702, p. 97).

³ *Ibid.*, April 1672 ("Misc. Aulica," 1702, p. 68).

⁴ 22 and 23 Car. II. c. 11.

⁵ Christie's "Shaftesbury," i. 288.

Carolinas, he pointed public energy to the possibilities of successful warfare with his usual address.¹ Prince Rupert² was almost the only public man to oppose the common maritime ideal for the sake of economy.

It was therefore in no way distressing to the average Englishman that he was fighting along with France against Protestants. As Buckingham³ said, Parliament does not oppose any war waged for the country's good. Of course, Charles was delighted. He could count on £225,000 a year, besides the promise of Walcheren, Sluys and Cadsand, and of a French army in case of a domestic emergency. To Arlington and Clifford also the religious aspect of the strife was very welcome. Yet the body of the nation was responsible for the war, and it accepted French help with pleasure. The accession of their ships would strengthen the fleet against the Dutch. As Arlington said, "We shall think we have a fair game,"⁴ and Charles could welcome d'Estrées⁵ at Portsmouth in

¹ Ludlow (ii. 206) resents his "smooth tongue" and "insidious carriage."

² Pepys' Diary, p. 515 (29th May 1668).

³ "Collection of Parliamentary Debates," i. 59.

⁴ Arlington to Gascoyn, 19th April 1672 (in "Misc. Aulica," 1702, p. 67).

⁵ *Ibid.*, 10th May 1672 (p. 69).

the name of the whole kingdom. In the light of after events, we know that the struggle which began in 1672 was only a move in the great scheme of Louis XIV., animated by the economic policy of Colbert and the political ambition of the Sun King. The hundred thousand men launched against the small Dutch land army in May 1672, were not fighting for English interests. Nevertheless, amid other issues the war did involve the wreck of the Dutch World Empire. The long struggle which William of Orange waged against the French "Sennacherib"¹ lost Holland everything except her honour. Maritime supremacy and colonial predominance were genuinely at stake during Charles II.'s second Dutch war.

It was indeed marked by no brilliant success at sea. De Ruyter was the hero of the struggle, and saved the Netherlands from the allied fleet. The battle of Southwold Bay was fought on 28th May (O.S.) 1672. The French did nothing, while the English lost five ships of the line,² eighteen captains, and two thousand five hundred men. James had twice to

¹ "Two Letters," etc. (1673), p. 7.

² "Netherland Historian" (1675), p. 27.

change his flagship. Although two Dutch admirals fell,¹ de Ruyter only lost one man-of-war—the *Josua*²—and he escaped in the fog. In December 1672, however, the English took Tobago.³ There had been much maladministration, but the nation was still ardent, and in February 1673 Parliament voted £70,000 a month for the expenses of the war. "His Majesty never spake better"⁴ than when he asked for the supply.

The Stop of the Exchequer in January 1672, and the Declaration of Indulgence in March 1672, had filled many shrewd minds with anxiety, but the majority of Englishmen were still eager to wipe out the memories of 1667, and make the war a milestone in the history of commerce. Seventy ships under Rupert sailed in the spring of 1673, and Arlington looked for success "at this season of the year when we are so near His Majesty's birthday."⁵ De Ruyter, however, again saved his country, and was able to pen a modest but confident despatch "on board the ship

¹ Ludlow's "Memoirs," ii. 431.

² "Netherland Historian," p. 27.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

⁴ Clifford to Gascoyn, 7th Feb. 1673 (in "Misc. Aulica," 1702, p. 98).

⁵ Arlington to Gascoyn, 26th May 1673 (in "Misc. Aulica," p. 107).

the *Seven Provinces* riding at anchor on Schonevelt the 8th of June 1673 in the forenoon."¹ The expected battle had proved indecisive. In August, four thousand soldiers were put on board York's fleet, but could not land at Brill because "there arose such a mist that one could scarce see three ships' length."² On the 11th August 1673 (O.S.) Rupert fought till seven in the evening close under the Zealand Cliffs, but failed to scatter the Dutch. Well might the Netherlands thank Heaven for their great leader.

"Terruit Hispanos Ruyter ter terruit Anglos ;
Ter ruit in Gallos, territus ipse ruit."

Meanwhile, affairs in England had effected what failure in action could not do ; they had driven the chief partisans of war to a policy of peace. Shaftesbury's school of thought was devoted to mercantile and maritime ends, and hated Popery and despotism. The King, however, had made it clear that his idea of the war was not national but personal—dictated only by his absolutist and Catholic ambitions. Hence the Test Act of March 1673, and the strenuous resistance made by the original promoters of the war to its further continuance. Shaftesbury³ ceased

¹ "Netherland Historian," pp. 201-2.

² *Ibid.*, p. 246.

³ "Collection of Parliamentary Debates," i. 41.

to bless God for having given Charles to Britain. In February 1674, "a good, faithful and indissolvable peace"¹ was concluded at Westminster. The price of peace entailed the retention of conquests out of Europe, and the payment of twenty tons of gold (£200,000) by Holland to Great Britain. Henceforward, the Dutch had to carry on the world's work of resistance to Louis XIV. against France alone.

Public opinion during the war had been in some ways admirable. It was sufficiently enlightened to stop the struggle when it saw its own ends neglected. There was indeed the customary sale of posts. When Buckingham² gave £1600 for a regiment he only acted as "an honest English gentleman." There was also the usual chaos in the management of the fleet. North³ in his "Examen" accuses Shaftesbury and Rupert with palming off "nealed guns," worth £20 each, to the State, as being guns worth £60. An enemy, however, is a bad witness. Certainly the men who fought, upheld the glory of the land with a gallantry which history has far too often neglected. All classes gave their lives for

¹ "Netherland Historian."

² "Collection of Parliamentary Debates," i. 56.

³ North's "Examen," p. 52.

the common interest, and endured the privations of a life at sea, which entailed scanty and inedible rations. Philip Carteret, a son of Sir George Carteret, was killed in Southwold Bay. James Hamilton, a son of the Earl of Abercorn, died of wounds received in action in June 1673. "No person danced better nor was any a more general lover."¹ Berry, a man of different station but of greater genius, won knight-hood by his heroism on board the *Resolution* in Southwold Bay, where the Earl of Arran also won distinction — Ormond's son, who "played well at tennis and on the guitar, and was pretty successful in gallantry."²

Those who are apt to cavil at the men of Charles II.'s reign should indeed recognise how many of the politicians who led public opinion were also ready to die to give it effect. "The most noble and famous Earl of Sandwich,"³ whose nickname of "bulk-breaking Sandwich"⁴ should not obscure his zeal for national progress, fought very bravely in the *Royal James* in the battle of Southwold Bay; his ship was blown up, and his dead body was afterwards found

¹ Hamilton's "Memoirs of Count Grammont" (ed. 1876), p. 97.

² *Ibid.*, p. 95.

³ "Two Letters," etc. (1673), p. 17.

⁴ "Flagellum Parliamentarium," p. 4.

floating on the sea. Spragge, who was commander of the *Loyall London* in the same fight, was killed a year later in a foolhardy attempt to avenge himself on van Tromp. De Ruyter said he was "a brave soldier."¹

When once the English won the upper hand their policy gained in the gentler qualities. On 26th May 1673 an agreement² was made with the Dutch, by which no ransom was to be claimed for doctors who were captured; they were to be freed at once. Moreover, prisoners were not to be stripped, and lists of their names were to be interchanged. The truth is that after Louis XIV.'s ferocious ambitions had barred all chance of the Dutch continuing to monopolise the world's carrying trade, there was no longer anything to hinder a better relationship between England and the Netherlands. Charles, it is true, again negotiated secretly with France in February 1676, but Louis preferred then to side for the time with the Whigs, and so drove the King to a Dutch alliance in 1677.

The change of tone after 1674 was therefore reflected in every expression of English public opinion. The birth of Dutch

¹ "Netherland Historian," p. 248.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 193-7.

sympathies in Danby,¹ and the marriage of William and Mary on 4th November (O.S.) 1677 were corollaries to the Test Act and to the unpopularity of the Duke of York's alliance with Mary of Modena. The Dutch were no longer our chief rivals; Colve, who had retaken New York, had been obliged to evacuate it by the Treaty of Westminster. The better guides of public opinion transferred their enmity to France.

The Hollanders were still described in 1683 as close "at our heels in the race of naval power,"² but in many markets they had in fact been absolutely outstripped. They had to pay five per cent.³ customs as against the English three at the port of Smyrna, and in the midst of war they could not compete against the powerful Levant Company of London,⁴ which employed seven thousand men, and spent £5000 a year in the payment of tariff dues. In 1697,⁵ £400,000 worth of English goods were believed to be yearly shipped to Turkey.

It would, of course, be absurd to infer that

¹ Danby's "Letters" (ed. 1710), p. 109, refer to an alleged "constant aversion to the French interest."

² "England's Guide to Industry," Preface.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁵ "Discourse of Ways and Means," p. 103.

the whole hostility to Holland had therefore always been ill-advised and deplorable. The decline of the hatred after 1674 only illustrates that no enmity is intrinsically "natural." Certainly, that against the Dutch died suddenly. William of Orange, who had but lately put "new heart and life" into de Ruyter's fleet,¹ became the hope of Halifax and the better sort of Whigs, who despised the truculence of the Oxford Parliament (March, 1681) and the wildness of the Rye House Plot. Even Shaftesbury, the author of the *delenda est Carthago* spirit, died in January 1683, a refugee and a naturalised Dutchman² at Abraham Keck's house on the Guelder Key.³

The prejudice, indeed, still lingered in the minds of merchants. In 1680, men looked as jealously as ever at the eight thousand⁴ Dutch ships which plied in the North Sea fishery, and at the supremacy enjoyed by Holland in boat-building. On the other hand, the policy of the Navigation Acts was a proved failure.⁵ Coke,⁶ who denounced it as such in 1670, was followed by other writers, who showed⁷ how it enabled the

¹ "Netherland Historian," p. 247.

² Christie's "Shaftesbury," ii. 451. ³ *Ibid.*, ii. 455.

⁴ "Britannia Linguens," p. 31. ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁶ Coke's "Discourse on Trade," p. 27.

⁷ "Britannia Linguens," pp. 52, 66.

Dutch to buy timber and cordage in Continental markets far more cheaply than could Englishmen in their own home market, and thereby to charge less for freight. In spite of their French War, the Netherlands gained supremacy in the Baltic trade,¹ and outdistanced English companies in the trade of Russia, Danzig, Hamburg, and the East.² "Philanglus," however, saw that the true remedy for his country was not a Dutch war, but a reform of commercial methods. He would have chemists turn from ³ "telescopes and gimcracks" to utilitarian science; he would export "tunnes of divines"⁴ instead of bullion, prohibit foreign imports, open the East to interlopers, abolish the ⁵ Poor Law Act of Settlement, and, in fact, he taught that the truest economy lies in self-improvement, not defiance.

¹ "Britannia Languens," p. 159.

² *Ibid.*, p. 152.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 102. ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

CHAPTER IV

THE ENGLISH VIEW OF FRANCE

THE subservience of English policy to that of Louis XIV. became its chief feature after the close of the second Dutch war. The motives of the Crown had become distinct from those of the people during the struggle, and the Sun King—always a great power in a disunited state—cast a dark shadow over the public life. Charles was reduced to the level of a pensioner, and Whig leaders like Sidney and Powle did not scruple to play the same wanton part. It will, however, be seen that the corruption of King and Parliament did not reflect the true feeling of England. Her subservience was not national—only superficial; her view of France was, in reality, independent and robust. All reasonable men have a certain consistency, and it would have been unnatural had the people, who judged questions relating to trade and to the Dutch with virile shrewdness, lost all manliness and sense of purpose

when opposed to France. The fact is, that literature only indicates the full tide of popular thought when knowledge is widespread and the Press powerful. This was not the case under Charles II. The Gallicised literary style did not imply a Gallicised people. The Court wits bore the same relation to the average Englishman under the Stuarts, as learned monks bore to the average Englishman under the Plantagenets.

It is therefore right to turn from the too familiar scenes where the trail of French influence lay conspicuously, and to look at aspects of English life more truly representative than Court pageantry, with its bevy of mistresses and its led horses, "after the custom of the Court of France."¹ Signs of the times are not always on the surface, and the sensation of the hour has not of necessity a place in history. The Treaty of Dover policy and Danby's famous letter, which "is writ by my order, C. R.,"² were not inspired by the people. Their real feeling towards France became bitter after 1672, and foreshadowed that long and historic hostility which flamed out in 1702 and closed in 1815.

The reverence for French fashions under

¹ Clarendon's *Autobiography*, ii. 188.

² Danby's "Letters" (ed. 1710), pp. 72-6.

Charles II. was merely exotic—a flaw in the natures of English politicians and dramatists. Even the loyal and pious author of the “*Anglorum Speculum*”¹ omits Anselm from his list of English saints “as being a Frenchman.” Moreover, the upper classes followed French taste more than French policy. It was no surprising tendency that “the new French romance and the spick and span new play”² should attract the British aristocracy. Many Cavaliers had found a haven of refuge in the Court of Louis XIV., while every English gentleman travelled through the land of his polite neighbours. An economist³ calculated that these tourists enriched France with £200,000 a year. French literature deserved its fame. Locke’s “Thoughts concerning Reading for a Gentleman,”⁴ recommend Boileau’s “*Longinus*,” Rochefoucauld,⁵ and La Bruyère, besides the travels of Thevenot,⁶ Pyrard, Bergeron, Sagard and Bernier. Molière and Racine furnished Wycherley’s generation with dramatic models. Yet a man might cultivate French manners and still have an English heart. Few even

¹ “*Anglorum Speculum*,” p. 3.

² “*Britannia Languens*,” Preface.

³ “Discourse of Ways and Means,” p. 93.

⁴ Locke: “Some Thoughts concerning Reading,” etc. (Works, 1823 edition), iii. 295.

⁵ *Ibid.*, iii. 299.

⁶ *Ibid.*, iii. 298.

among the French partisans in England really perceived what Louis XIV. stood for. The solemn and stupid Arlington¹ indeed was the only politician of the day who knew the French language well ; Clarendon² understood, but could not speak it.

Trade jealousy against France only arose when the Dutch rivalry was breaking down. The practical minds of the English commercial class prevented it from appreciating at once the dream of Colbert, who alone of French statesmen grasped the great idea of a World Empire. To the unimaginative man the sounding titles of Colbert's chartered companies were only pretentious follies. If, however, the English view of the French was thus merely indifferent before 1674, it was certainly more healthy than that of the Government. On 10th May 1663 de Cominges³ wrote that the English are the natural haters of the French. The common idea was (if anything) contemptuous, and men treated any subject of Louis XIV. with the same scorn meted out by Evelyn to a certain⁴ "French peddling woman who used

¹ Hamilton's "Memoirs of Count Grammont," pp. 10-51.

² Jusserand's "French Ambassador at Court of Charles II." (1892), p. 55.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

⁴ Evelyn's Diary, ii. 57 (1st March 1617).

to bring petticoats and fans and baubles out of France to the ladies." There was no real intimacy between the two countries. The ambassador, de Cominges,¹ knew no English, and could hardly find a single interpreter, while French visitors to Great Britain described their travels in a tone such as Englishmen employed after expeditions to Persia or Morocco. It was not till after the Huguenot immigration of 1685 that England found any such sympathetic observer as the clever and witty Misson.

Patin's² account of his travels (1674) is not luminous. He wondered at the size and noise of London,³ but his work is only useful for its materials for a panegyric on Charles II.,⁴ who seemed to this Parisian doctor even more fascinating than he appeared to Cosmo de' Medici when he saw him strolling out of the Maiden's Inn⁵ at Newmarket, "in a plain and simple country dress,"⁶ ornamented only by the George and Garter. A far more suggestive work is that of a

¹ Jusserand, p. 54.

² "Relations Historiques, etc., de Voyages," by Patin (Lyons, 1674).

³ Patin, p. 167.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 172-3.

⁵ "Travels of Cosmo III." (Eng. trans. 1821), p.

205.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

Frenchman called Sorbieri, who published his narrative¹ at Cologne in 1666.

Now part of this writer's description of the country is quite irrelevant to its public opinion. He found the nobility² learned and enlightened, and enthusiastic scientists. He saw half a dozen private laboratories, attended meetings of the Royal Society, and went to a meeting of the Royal College of Physicians³ in what he called the "rue Biscopgetstriicht." He talked astronomy with Charles II., and marvelled at the common ignorance⁴ of soups and biscuits.

The valuable part of the story is the light it sheds on public opinion. It is an excellent plan to turn from the exasperating history of the Cabal ministry to Sorbieri's picture of the coming of a Frenchman to Dover, which in those days had no port at all, "but only an entrance for small barks."⁵ The average foreigner did not land in England on a "grand tour," nor with an overflowing purse. The children ran after Sorbieri in the streets calling out, "a Mounser! a Mounser!"⁶ and the vulgar scoffed at him and his friends as "French

¹ S. Sorbieri's "Relation d'un Voyage en Angleterre" (Cologne, 1666).

² *Ibid.*, p. 62. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 67. ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

⁵ Misson's "Memoirs and Observations," p. 68.

⁶ Sorbieri, p. 10.

dogs." They were, in fact, rude and haughty, and preferred the "woeful vice of drinking,"¹ to politer ways of life. The ordinary Englishman was at least far beyond the pale of French influence. In London, Sorbiere remarked, that "hardly a day passes without a workman going to a tavern to smoke with one of his friends."² It is an irony of history that the hope of the land did not lie in the aristocrats of the Court but in the uneducated masses, whom Cosmo de' Medici³ described in 1669 as eating far too much meat, and as very uncivil to all foreigners, especially to the French. Temple,⁴ Essex, and Halifax leant steadily to the plan of a Dutch alliance against them, and if Shaftesbury's policy had not driven the Whigs to prefer Monmouth to the Prince of Orange, and to unite with France, his "brisk city boys" would have been roused against the schemes of Louvois and Colbert. His excessive zeal forced Halifax to oppose the Exclusion Bill. A better leader would indeed have played a greater part, for his followers could have been led easily to

¹ Clarendon's *Autobiography*, ii. 35.

² Sorbiere, p. 115.

³ "Travels of Cosmo III.," p. 396; cf. Misson, p.

313.

⁴ Ranke's "History of England in the Seventeenth Century," iv. 167.

understand the danger by the agitators and pamphleteers whom he commanded, because "for a penny you may have all the news in England and other countries—of murders, floods, fires, tempests, and what not, in the weekly news books."¹ The coffee-houses which dated from about 1650 were an even greater power than the Press.

The chief reason why, even after 1674, the hostility towards France did not find such open expression was ignorance. The nation had hardly rid itself of the old delusion that Spain was a more natural enemy than France; to Waller the Spaniards were still pre-eminently "the rich troublers of the world's repose."² Certainly England did not grasp that Louis XIV.'s offences against Europe were, in effect, offences against England. Until 1674, it viewed the policy of the Government towards France with an unwise apathy. Holland was so much more obviously a country to be dreaded and brought low. The men who supported Shaftesbury and acquitted Penn were not what that generation called "cullies," fools; on the contrary, among the astute Londoners, "a man may

¹ Peacham's "Worth of a Penny" (London, 1667), p. 21; cf. Misson, pp. 39-40.

² Waller's "British Navy."

be damnably bubbled if he is not very sharp"¹—but they did not see far. They had a horror of individuals² like the Duchess of Portsmouth—Charles's favourite, "Fubs"³—but, on the other hand, they did not realise that a struggle with France must follow that with the Netherlands, because the world had not room enough for Greater Britain and Colbert's Greater France.

If Louis XIV. and Louvois were the guiding spirits in French policy on the Continent, Colbert was the statesman responsible for the dawn of anxiety in England. In 1667, he closed the French market to English cloth merchants. But for him the country might never have grasped the idea that to resist Louis was a national duty. His aims, however, were more obviously antagonistic to English interests than his master's, and this fact slowly won the attention of the people. He founded a West India Company at Havre, an East India Company at Lorient, a Levant Company at Marseilles, a Northern Company at Dunkirk. He was the cause of the increase of the navy from 30 ships in 1661 to 273 in 1683. He founded the

¹ Misson's "Memoirs and Observations," p. 39.

² Evelyn's Diary, ii. 57 (1st March 1671).

³ Cunningham's "Nell Gwyn" (ed. 1892), p. 110.

woollen manufactures¹ of Languedoc and Picardy. A pioneer of Protection and an enthusiast for State interference, he sought outlets for French enterprise all over the world. The population² of France was more than twice that of Great Britain, and was famous for valour and skill. But for the wasteful schemes of Louis XIV., the religious intolerance of the government, and the vicious feudalism of its colonial system, Colbert would have brought home to the English mind the danger of French competition long before it was in fact realised. As it happened, the popular view before 1674 was focussed almost wholly on Dutch rivalry. In 1663, Fortrey pointed out that the balance of trade with France was against England, and the "Present Interest of England" (1671), painted France as our true enemy. The first pamphlet was ignored in the stress of the war with Holland, while the ordinary observer of that day could hardly appreciate a tract like the "Present Interest,"³ which dared to suggest that Dutch competition served as a good incentive to English energy.

¹ "Petitions against Trade with France," pp. 16-19 (1713).

² Gregory King gives the population of France as 13½ millions, England, 5½, in 1696 ("Observations upon State of England," p. 36).

³ "Present Interest of England" (1671), p. 33.

The growth of any general resentment against France dated from the second Dutch war. The country felt that it was duped by Louis, and that d'Estrées' ships were only disguised enemies. In the great engagement of June 1673, Banckers cut off the French squadron at noon, and it took no further part in the action. "I saw never a ship of the French strike a stroak,"¹ was the complaint of an English captain, and Ludlow² describes them as having been spectators rather than actors. Martel³ was said to have been imprisoned for helping Rupert actively. The Dutch account itself related that "the French fought little or nothing but left the English in the brunt." The six or eight thousand⁴ British troops under Monmouth, who remained in French service in spite of the treaty of Westminster, and who included such notable characters as John Churchill and Thomas Otway, the author of "Venice Preserved," complained of French ingratitude for their work at Maestricht and Seneff. Their recall⁵ was only averted by a majority of one in a

¹ "Pacquet-Boat Advice" (London, 1678), p. 8.

² Ludlow's "Memoirs," ii. 431.

³ Cobbett's "Parliamentary History," iv. 601.

⁴ "Netherland Historian," p. 27.

⁵ Cobbett's "Parliamentary History," iv. 700.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 708.

turbulent Parliamentary division in May 1675. The war party was consequently at one with lovers of peace in detestation of France, and found an opportunist ally in Danby. It was for this reason that Barillon was ready to assist in his betrayal by Montagu at the end of 1678. Even Charles did not care to stand between the nation and its enemies, for he was too "sick of being tost from pillar to post"¹ to hazard another exile, and throughout the Popish Plot agitation made inertia an art.

After 1674, there was therefore a steady increase of French unpopularity in England. For a time, however, it was far more economic than political—due to Colbert, not Louvois. Mercantilism swayed commercial theory, and in 1675 Downing presented a report by a Parliamentary committee, which resulted in the prohibitive act of 1678 against all French imports. Its repeal in 1685 and substantial re-enactment in 1689 give to this law a Whig colour and partisan flavour, which are not really true to life. Tories were only free-traders by accident, and resistance to Colbert's policy was a national instinct. Shaftesbury, who was always sensible, whether working against the pedantry of Chancery or the designs of the Court, utilised this fear of

¹ Misson's "Memoirs and Observations," p. 32.

France to strengthen opposition to the Crown. At any rate, public opinion drifted from the Dutch question to the then more alarming topic of French aggrandisement. The pamphleteers of 1678 repeated the fervour of those of 1664, but after the August of 1678 they gave the Popish terror the place of the former jealousy of Holland, and substituted Louis XIV. for de Witt as their target of hostility. They complained that "the French grow too fatt."¹ The liveliest tract in the whole political library of that age was a characteristic outcome of the alteration in public opinion—"The Pacquet-Boat Advice, or a Discourse concerning War with France" (1678)—which exemplified the economic origin of the feeling against that country as well as its more political development.

The writer has just crossed from the Continent. A Frenchman on board has described the great schemes of Colbert, "the patron of merchants,"² and predicted that "France would certainly be the only emporium or market of the world."³ Such an ambition ought to be checked at once by England, by peaceful means if you will, but by arms if otherwise impossible. Anything

¹ "England's Guide to Industry," Preface.

² "Pacquet-Boat Advice," p. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

would be better than the present folly of aping French habits. It is a bad thing for England that we "are wont with a kind of witchcraft to dote upon France."¹ The rivalry of that country is strengthened by our own disunion² and impolicy.

This despondent point of view is relieved by a bright sketch of an English captain on board, "a good blunt gentleman,"³ who had fought in the late war, and who held that not one in a thousand of his countrymen would oppose a war with the French. He is indeed an excellent type of the English politician who realised that the time had come to transfer the attributes of "natural" enmity from Holland to France. In one glowing sentence he is made to say: "I hope yet before I die to help to open some of the gates of Paris . . . and to hear the drums beat the heavy English march through the streets again."⁴ This is the sort of ambition which led to the ultimate success of Greater Britain. "The French without designs!"⁵ exclaims this fervent patriot; "You shall as soon find a monkey without tricks," and he goes off to dream gleefully "of drums and trumpets and cannons and granado's storms and battels."⁶

¹ "Pacquet-Boat Advice," p. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

² *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

Thus this lively tract depicted an alteration in English sentiment towards France which the spiritless policy of the Government should not be allowed to obscure. In suffering economic attacks from other states, Great Britain is proverbially patient, but when Colbert relied on the fact that she imported twenty thousand tuns of wine¹ every year from Bordeaux, to insist that his measures would meet with no reprisals, he made a mistake. Claret was sacrificed for port, and the French trade for the mercantile theory. The change lost the French wine merchants £137,000 a year.² The long duel between the two nations, which began to be effective under William III. and ended at Waterloo, did not originally captivate the English mind by any political possibility; its origin was largely economic. Its religious aspect was only created by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Certainly the groundwork of British enmity under Charles II. was opposition to Colbert's commercial ideal. As Slingsby Bethel put it, trade "is the glory of England."

This last man was a type of the later pamphleteers of the reign. The "Shimei" of Dryden's "Absalom and Achitophel," and an

¹ "England's Guide to Industry," p. 199.

² Cobbett's "Parliamentary History," iv., App. No. 11.

austere Yorkshire Whig—he had made himself very popular by his agility at packing¹ juries while sheriff of London in 1680. He was the foe of all Court policy. To further commerce, his work on the “Interest of the Princes and States of Europe” (1681) suggested several good ideas—toleration of Dissenters,² the encouragement of Protestant immigration (which had already enriched England with men like Papillon and Houblon), and also the reduction of law fees and doctors’ charges. His great object³ however, was to unite Europe against France. He quoted Raleigh’s description⁴ of that nation being “false, insolent and covetous neighbours.” England’s proper course was to join in an alliance against her along with Holland,⁵ Spain, the Empire, and even with the Pope, since “it is folly for him to think that his gaudy copes, crosses, and tripple Crown will defend his see against the French king.”⁶ Indeed it had always been the common belief of Englishmen that the subjects of Louis XIV. were a faithless people, and the crowd had roared with joy in 1670, when Nell Gwyn declaimed against the French while she spoke the prologue to

¹ North’s “Examen,” p. 93.

² Bethel’s “Interest of the Princes of Europe,” p. 32.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

"Almanzor and Almahide" "in a broad-brimmed hat and waist belt."¹ The debates² on the Exclusion Bill veered continually towards attacks on France.

A year before Bethel's tract appeared, "Philanglus" had written "Britannia Languens," in which the new fear of French competition had blossomed into full-blown pessimism. He³ asked why this people should suddenly have become prodigiously powerful. Critics had suggested that the cause lay in their superior thrift⁴ and cheaper means of litigation, but the true reason was their wise policy in encouraging skilled workmen⁵ to come to France from other lands, in importing less goods⁶ than they exported, in tolerating heretics and Jews,⁷ and in placing a 50 per cent. tax on the importation of English cloth. He noted how French traders were beginning to compete with English in Newfoundland,⁸ Greenland,⁹ Spain,¹⁰ Portugal, Italy, and even in the home market for druggist.¹¹ His remedies are the encouragement of naturalisation,¹² religious toleration¹³ and better

¹ Cunningham's "Nell Gwyn."

² "Collection of Parliamentary Debates," ii., 50-1.

³ "Britannia Languens," p. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 103.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 104-6.

commercial instruction. With a curious touch of later-day prejudice, he writes : "Our youth never read anything of manufactures, exportation or importation in Homer, Vergil or their Colledge notes."¹ It is, however, very remarkable that he still deems the Dutch infinitely more formidable competitors than the French.

Indeed the chief contrast between the hostile view of the French and the earlier enmity towards the Dutch was that the former was much more free from apprehension. The competition of Holland was an evil which really weighed on the people's happiness ; that of France was as yet hardly taken seriously. The cost of production was greater there than in England, except as to dyeing,² where France had an advantage by producing her own drugs. Bethel³ complained of her oppressive attacks on English traders in the West Indies and Newfoundland, and the author of "England's Guide to Industry"⁴ (1683) noted the growth of French trade with Guinea and Egypt, but such antagonism with foreigners was only in the usual course of things.⁵ The fact is that if

¹ "Britannia Languens," p. 101.

² "Petitions against Trade with France," p. 19.

³ Bethel, p. 60.

⁴ "England's Guide to Industry," p. 94.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

English traders were less able than the Dutch, they were far more capable than the French, who did not "affect navigation."¹ They asserted this themselves. "I see no reason why a Frenchman should not imitate our English fashions as well as we his."² Only fops bought Paris merchandise³—perfumed gloves, pocket looking-glasses, apricot paste and essences.

There was therefore no reason for public opinion to be agitated by any fear of Louis XIV. Englishmen could not possibly have to undergo an invasion by his arms, and hence their indifference to his blazing contempt for the rights of weaker states. English ephemeral literature was at least sane and thorough under Charles II. It dealt with numberless trade topics—with interest⁴ and with weights and measures, with a proposed land-bank,⁵ with a land registry,⁶ public work-houses⁷ like that at

¹ "England's Guide to Industry," p. 209.

² Peacham's "Worth of a Penny" (1667), p. 27.

³ Hamilton's "Memoirs of Count Grammont," p. 115.

⁴ "Interest of Money Mistaken" (1668); "Brief Observations upon Trade" (1668); "A Tract against Usurie" (1668); Thomas Manley on Usury, (1669).

⁵ Cradocke's "Wealth Discovered" (1661), p. 8.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁷ "Some Proposals for the Employing of Poor," by T. F. (1667), p. 15.

Aldersgate, with the linen manufacture,¹ with means of increasing² the population, with taxation,³ and above all, with plantations⁴ in America. These subjects were not all treated with success. Colonies for instance, had a greater function than to provide opportunities for gardening and fishing,⁵ and did not deserve to be painted as a burden⁶ to England by injudicious pessimists. At the same time, any intelligent discussion of such matters in France would have made Colbert happy indeed. Instead of that, the people had no voice at all; they starved and bled, and had their manhood broken in the sweat of the *corvée*. As for the upper classes, they were so ignorant as to scorn Jean Bart as "a bear,"⁷ and to sneer at Nova Scotia as merely "a few acres of snow." The Abbé de Polignac⁸ was only the type of the day, when he assured Louis that the rain of Marly does not wet. Englishmen were

¹ "Some Proposals for the Employing of Poor," by T. F. (1667), p. 9.

² Tract of 1677 (London); and Coke's "Discourse on Trade" (1670), p. 54.

³ "England's Wants" (1667) p. 4.

⁴ Peacham's "Worth of a Penny" (1667), p. 32.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ "England's Guide to Industry," Preface.

⁷ V. C. Préseau's "Grandes Figures Nationales" (1870), p. 231.

⁸ St Simon's "Memoirs," i. 310.

made of different calibre. In spite of the many knaves in office, the reign of Charles II. witnessed Skinner's case ("very hot work")¹ and Bushell's case, the impeachment of Danby and the Habeas Corpus Act. The reason why the country's dislike to France did not overrule the wishes of the King was simply that French rivalry was not yet manifest in the one sphere of activity, in which English resentment ripens soonest. Mere military grandeur did not impress public opinion like commercial predominance, and, indeed, Frenchmen soon learnt that the one was futile without the other. A bad king like Charles II. allowed England to prosper, while as patriotic a king as Louis XIV., secured for his country only a meretricious splendour.

"He fought a thousand glorious wars,
And more than half the world was his,
And somewhere now in yonder stars
Can tell mayhap, what greatness is."²

¹ Pepys' Diary, p. 508 (1st May 1668).

² Thackeray.

CHAPTER V

THE NATIONAL CHARACTER

NO man with a poor opinion of himself will go very far, and self-confidence is half the battle in international competition. Certainly the Englishman of Charles II.'s reign painted his country in glowing colours, and his complacency bordered almost on vain-glory. National pride was, in fact, the chief feature in national character, and the mainstay of public opinion. Our yeomanry, wrote Slingsby Bethel, "are the best of their kind in the world, the peasants of other countries being brutes in religion, good nature and civility compared to them."¹ In spite of French pretensions and Dutch opposition, the average Englishman of the day held his head high, and faced all comers cheerfully. Like Dr Johnson a century later, he considered every foreigner a fool until convinced of the contrary.

The one flaw in this characteristic was its

¹ Bethel's "Interest of the Princes of Europe," p. 9.

capacity to degenerate into something less fine and more blatant. The uncouth debates as to Catherine's capacity to bear children were (like those on the old Pretender's birth) more due to the manners of the age than to individual coarseness of mind; but public opinion, without being either placid or pensive, should always be steady and reasonable. National pride, however, led to singular vagaries in argument. The Englishman gloried in his heavy diet, and, according to contemporary writers, it was indeed remarkable. London, said Henry Peacham, author of "*The Worth of a Penny*" (1667), "eateth more good beef and mutton in one month than all Spain, Italy and a part of France in a whole year."¹ It was therefore right to hold that good food makes the man, and to be proud of the famous English beef.² An Englishman³ spent £1. 1s. 1d. a year on his ale and beer, the Frenchman but 8s., and the Dutchman only 7s. 3d. ⁴"The French, say we of England, have the best stomachs, and are the greatest trenchermen in the world." If such praise is earned by Londoners, what

¹ Peacham's "*Worth of a Penny*," p. 23.

² Misson's "*Memoirs and Observations*," p. 2.

³ King's "*Observations upon State of England*," p. 67.

⁴ Peacham, p. 25.

eulogy can be adequate for the men of Yorkshire¹ and Lancashire, Cheshire and Shropshire, where folk "live by white meats as milk, butter, cheese, curds?" The first wife of the Duke of York was proud to be "one of the highest feeders in England."²

Excellence in dining gave the country a surface vanity, but its pride stood out in a more refined and noble way during the wars of the reign, during the plague and the fire. Publications like that of Edward Chamberlayne's³ "State of Great Britain in 1669," stimulated the ardour of the race. The calm confidence of the national patriotism was then the best safeguard of a worthy public opinion. The fury of the Popish Plot days, which began in August 1678, and the political distress of the reaction which made Charles almost a despot after 1682, both belong rather to the story⁴ of the Revolution of 1688 than to that of foreign policy under Charles II. In quieter times such fanaticism was unknown. To oppose freedom of thought⁵

¹ Peacham, p. 25.

² Hamilton's "Memoirs of Count Grammont," p. 306.

³ Edward Chamberlayne was tutor to Charles's son, Henry Fitzroy, Duke of Grafton. The later editions of his work were compiled by John Chamberlayne.

⁴ Seeley's "Growth of British Policy" (ed. 1895), ii. 223.

⁵ Alsop's "Melius Inquirendum," p. 396.

was merely to "pave a broad causey" for the Pope. When Clarendon was sought out one day in 1664 by a Benedictine monk, "who looked rather like a carter who spoke ill English,"¹ and who proposed an alliance between England and his master, the Catholic Bishop of Munster, that orthodox statesman did not demur, and thought the proposal "looked as if it came from Heaven." After all, there was no reason for Anglicanism to disdain expediency when even Louis XIV.² allied himself with Swedes and Turks, and, in opposition to the Duke of Tuscany, tried to persuade the Leghorn Jews to emigrate to Marseilles.

Laws passed to repress Catholicism and Nonconformity were indeed severe and regrettable, but their enforcement was left to local justice, which rarely went to extremes. Bunyan's sufferings at Bedford are almost a myth. The work of persecution was more effectual as regards Romanism than Dissent. Bethel tells how well Yorkshire had done, and cites the cases of Halifax and Bradford, "two parishes . . . remote and furthest from the eye of the Church, where the first hath not one Papist though twenty thousand communicants, and the latter but one (a silly old

¹ Clarendon's Autobiography, ii. 447.

² "Britannia Languens," p. 115.

man) though it hath ten thousand in it.”¹ The beliefs of such typical places could survive more than one treaty of Dover. The zealous interpreted S.P.Q.R.² to stand for “*stultus populus quærit Romam.*” England with all its bad laws was Protestant and free. There was no caste as in France, removed from other men by a world of privilege and prejudice. The people were so devoted to the idea of independence that an advocate of workhouses proposed to style their inmates “invited guests.”³ It is alluring but idle to lament that this sensible spirit never penetrated into the theological legislation, and that the Bermuda emigrants were rather refugees than colonists, when (in the words of Marvell’s poem):—

“Thus sung they in the English boat,
A holy and a cheerful note,
And all the way to guide their chime,
With falling oars they kept the time.”

The features in the national character which really contributed most to strengthen popular opinion as to foreign policy, were its curiosity and its consequent love of adventure. The first quality dominated every

¹ Bethel’s “Interest of the Princes of Europe,” p. 30.

² Edward Leigh “To the Reader,” in “Select Observations,” etc.

³ “Some Proposals for Employing of the Poor,” by T. F. (London, 1678), p. 15.

class, and left its mark on the history of science in England in the foundation of the Royal Society (1662). Sorbieri¹ and Hamilton² noted the experiments of Rupert. One pessimist³ lamented the time and energy wasted (as he thought) on magnifying glasses, telescopes, and the weighing of air. Cosmo de' Medici⁴ was shown a Moor's skin, and a wonderful clock. The King⁵ himself was an enthusiastic chemist, "curious in physical and mechanical experiments."⁶ Evelyn was delighted to see "a melancholy water-fowl brought from Astracan by the Russian Ambassador. It was diverting to see how he would toss up and turn a flat fish, plaice or flounder, to get it into his gullet."⁷ In 1684 he went to see "the first rhinoceros or unicorn ever seen in England,"⁸ and took great interest in Flamstead's⁹ prediction of an eclipse of the moon. This intelligent curiosity took the form of a love of adventure in men less cultured and

¹ Sorbieri's "Relation" (1666), p. 58.

² Hamilton's "Memoirs of Grammont," p. 300.

³ "Britannia Languens," p. 102.

⁴ "Cosmo III.'s Travels," p. 188.

⁵ Pepys' Diary, p. 556 (15th Jan. 1669).

⁶ Misson's "Memoirs and Observations," p. 32.

⁷ Evelyn's Diary, i. 389 (9th Feb. 1665).

⁸ *Ibid.*, ii. 199 (22nd Oct. 1684).

⁹ Evelyn to Pepys, 3rd June 1684 (Pepys' Diary, p. 633).

fastidious. In 1660 for instance, there was "a great design of sending a venture to some parts of Africa to dig for gold ore there,"¹ and in 1661, one William Garratt, offered to find Brazilian silver mines "now hid from the Dutch and Portuguese."² The whole country had eager hopes for colonial success, and rejoiced in its trophies. Legislation³ only impeded side industries of New England; it gave a constant impetus to importation from the colonies of tobacco, hides, beaver, bearskins, saxafras, and planks made from black walnut trees. Parliament⁴ even legislated against "tobaccho" sowing in England and Ireland, in view of the colonial interests, and only allowed its cultivation in the physic gardens of Oxford and Cambridge, and in private surgeries. The Sachems of Rhode Island sent two caps and inlaid clubs to Charles II., and "a feather mantle and porcupine bag"⁵ to his Queen. By 1696,⁶ on an average, one thousand emigrants left annually for the plantations, of whom Newgate prisoners did not form an unduly large proportion.

Patriotism and enterprise were thus the

¹ Pepys' Diary, p. 54 (3rd Oct. 1660).

² Cal. State Papers, D. (1661-2), p. 205.

³ "England's Guide to Industry," p. 63.

⁴ 13 Car. II., c. 34; 15 Car. II., c. 7.

⁵ Colonial S. P. (1661-8), p. 342.

⁶ Gregory King's "Observations upon the State of England," p. 42.

common characteristics of the England of the later Stuarts, and they ought not to be cloaked by their absence from diplomacy and government. They were, as yet, unchastened by refinement, for the times were hard and the men rough. An excessively devout writer, called the King pious,¹ in 1684, and said that angels² constituted his life-guards; his earthly defenders, at all events, had nothing of the angelic. They did not share this author's admiration for the clergy, but would rather have typified the Church in "the vivacious vicar"³ of Bray in Berkshire, who was already a famous worthy. Their own ruder virtues were at least recognised by Europe. The Dutch found English seamen to be as brave as themselves. The Portuguese owed deep gratitude to English allies in their war of liberation. ⁴ "The valour of our countrymen is extolled beyond what can be credibly told," wrote Arlington after the defeat of the Spaniards by the allies at Ameixal. The English court was visited by "handsome, comely"⁵ Russians with fur caps, and by yet more barbarous envoys from Morocco

¹ "Anglorum Speculum," p. 506.

² *Ibid.*, p. 6.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 32-3.

⁴ Bennet to Ormond, 4th July 1663 ("Misc. Aulica," 1702, p. 293).

⁵ Pepys' Diary, p. 128 (27th Nov. 1662).

⁶ Larwood, p. 66; Evelyn's Diary, ii. 161 (11th Jan. 1682).

and Siam.¹ The national vigour was not even killed by the frenzy of the Popish Plot agitation, and by the terrorism of Charles's last despotic years. It only lay oppressed and dormant during the ousting of the Whigs from the corporation of London, and the sufferings of College, the Protestant joiner.

The true reason why the aspects of national character of the time, along with its public opinion and its aims, have been held uninteresting and undistinguished, does not arise from the popular defects which were really most marked—materialism and want of refinement. It is principally due to the absence of a great central figure. The England of Shaftesbury and Albemarle and Downing was the same as the England of Chatham or of Pitt, of Canning or of Beaconsfield, only it had no such shining name to personify its aspirations. The age of Chatham would have had little lustre without his own dominating personality, and England without the younger Pitt might have fallen a prey to Fox and ruin.

Yet, though a great man may raise the tone of public life, he does not affect the inner mind of a people very deeply. The mass sways the individual, not the individual

¹ *Ibid.*, ii. 199 (26th Sept. 1684).

the mass. Every celebrity in politics has become a celebrity owing to the earlier work of pioneers. Except therefore for the ruder conditions of the century in which they lived, the subjects of Charles II. were really no worse patriots and no less effective Empire-builders than those of George II. or George III. In 1683, no fewer than four hundred ships¹ plied between England and the plantations, while East Indian stock² stood at 185. Certainly the only earlier generation which can be compared to that of Charles II. for its Imperialist zeal was that of Drake and Raleigh, but these men like their epoch were prodigious. Heroism was a declining force in society during the seventeenth century, and the Europe of Louis XIV. resembled the Europe of Elizabeth in almost the same way that Charles II. resembled Henry IV.

It must also be remembered that the zeal of British adventurers under the later Stuarts was cramped by their fear of the executive. It was impossible to feel kindly towards the notion of a standing army in an age when Cromwell's Major-Generals were ominously remembered, and when the present Government was justly mistrusted. Thus Tangier was deemed "a kind of

¹ "England's Guide to Industry," Preface.

² *Ibid.*, p. 334.

nursery for popish soldiers,"¹ and the Life Guards² were considered a dangerous and costly innovation. The best outlet for the ardour of the day lay therefore in maritime enterprise. The navy numbered about 18,000 men³ and cost £200,000 a year.⁴ Its advocates worked consistently to further trade, and to carry into every corner of the globe the white kerseys of Devon, the "double dozens" of Leeds, and "perpetuana" serges.

The term "Imperialist" has been applied to the English politicians of the Restoration period, and those who view their true opinions with serious impartiality will recognise its aptness. Enthusiasm, indeed, they had little, except in a materialist sense, for the Cromwellian system had made emotionalism repellent. Among the epithets which the despicable Sacheverell lavished on toleration, such as monstrous, absurd, ridiculous, the terms⁵ romantic and enthusiastic are very typical. Even the idea of Empire was scrupulously chastened of any warm or chivalrous sentiment. Common sense dominated society. Men rebelled

¹ "Collection of Parliamentary Debates," i. 400.

² *Ibid.*, i. 64.

³ Cobbett's "Parliamentary History," iv. 408.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 427.

⁵ "Tryal of Dr. Henry Sacheverell" (House of Lords Report, 1710) p. 41.

against the fallacious austerity of Puritan policy, which placed all the diversions of life in a false perspective. In 1674, a Mr Russell attacked Buckingham for turning¹ "our Saviour and parliaments into ridicule and continuing prorogations." Such a juxtaposition of ideas was necessarily the fruit of a waning cause. If Shaftesbury drew illustrations from the Bible,² his more characteristic devices in oratory were phrases such as "the duty of a true-born Englishman,"³ which anticipated the flourishes of eighteenth-century speakers. The English mind had, in fact, become so secular as to border on godlessness. The pure Cavalier feeling which had animated Lovelace's verses to *Althea* and *Lucasta* was polluted by low-minded singers. Fashion despised the whole-hearted loyalty with which men like Clarendon and Southampton, Ormond and Evelyn, revered the Church of England. Sceptics like Shaftesbury and the King himself humoured astrologers, but had no spark of sympathy with devotionism. The Sabbatarian⁴ legislation of the day was the futile relic of a dead creed.

Lofty ideas and ethical breadth of mind

¹ Cobbett's "Parliamentary History," iv. 639.

² "Collection of Parliamentary Debates," ii. 364.

³ *Ibid.*, 368.

⁴ 29 Car. II., c. 7.

had vanished when Cromwell died, along with much baser forms of fervour and excitement. The small influence which religion exercises over public conduct is however abundantly proved in the ambitions of this generation of Englishmen, who, with all their indifference to principle, were none the less animated by that quiet and healthy patriotism, which is a classic pillar of one view of English politics. No men were ever more desirous to make England the most prosperous country in Europe, and the widest Empire in the world. They had many faults, but their end was great. It is the brightest sunshine that throws the deepest shadows.

This cast of thought has been common in Great Britain for many centuries, and its merits are not always undisputed. Some critics would rather have it more tinged by philosophic reflection, less coloured by the zest for action. When, however, the rude life and ungentle habits of the day are considered, it will hardly be deemed a blemish in the national character under Charles II. that it had a bias to the lighter side of life. Corruption reigned over administration, and lawlessness over the countryside; it was the age of Blood, who stole the regalia in 1671, of Claude du Val, the robber who was captured when

drunk "at the whole in the wall"¹ in Chandos Street, and of Nevison,² the Yorkshire highwayman. Amid the gloom of public distresses, it is pleasing to find that men triumphed over anxiety, and to read of cheerful frivolity—of pall-mall³ in St James's Park, of the introduction of the pretty Dutch art of "sliding with skeats,"⁴ and of the Mulberry Gardens, where Dryden gave tarts to Mrs. Reeve, the actress, and which were "very full of gentlemen and ladies that made love together till twelve o'clock at night the prettyliest: I vow it would do my heart good to see them."⁵ Such gaiety permeated society. One guardsman⁶ (Jack Ogle) dared to appear on parade with a scarlet petticoat instead of the regulation cloak, and was saved from punishment as much by his wit as by his sister's relationship to the Duke of York. If any new frolic was spoken of, the old benchers⁷ of Steele's Trumpet Club would recall Ogle's matchless brilliancy. Even the grave Prince Rupert⁸ was so enraptured with the charms

¹ John Ashton's "Social Life," p. 412.

² Burnley's "Yorkshire Stories Retold," p. 249.

³ Larwood's "Story of the London Parks," p. 343.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 365.

⁵ Shadwell's "Humourist," quoted in "Larwood," p. 283.

⁶ Larwood, p. 67.

⁷ *Tatler*, No. 132.

⁸ Hamilton's "Memoirs of Count Grammont," p. 301.

of Mrs. Hughes that he threw away his alembics and crucibles for "sweet powder and essences."

It will be accounted no mean tribute to the England of Charles II. that all such light-heartedness had in general no deterrent effect on the seriousness of public opinion as to the more vital issues of foreign policy. Writers on trade were habitually grave and sincere, and left it to others to "wear bays and laurel and be humd and clapt."¹ If men trifled at home, and tolerated disgraceful intolerance as to both Church and State, their view of national policy was truer and more enlightened than that of many generations in other ways more educated and liberal. They had the English quality of perseverance which has so often saved the country, and also the calculating prudence which is at least more profitable than hasty charity. They did not believe in unproductive work, and would have welcomed a reduction in the numbers of ale-keepers² and medical quacks, scholars and clergymen. Mere display they despised. Napoleon, in a brilliant conversation with Barry O'Meara, asserted that showy self-sacrifice like Castlereagh's never paid. "Stick to your ships, your commerce

¹ "Britannia Languens," Preface.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 133-4.

and counting-houses, and leave cordons, crosses and cavalry uniforms to the Continent, and you will prosper."¹ The preference for the more concrete possessions was at this period hearty and decisive. The country never forgot that trade was "the materialist part of its glory."² The French then had a proverb, "When Italy is without poisons, France without treasons, and England without war, the world will be without earth."³ Yet even the civil broils of Great Britain had a solid purpose.

Lastly, we are constantly struck by a characteristic of the day which marked England until quite recent times. At this period, Englishmen had an almost animal delight in physical prowess. They were stronger and better fed than foreigners. King⁴ estimated that they paid £3. 16s. 5d. per head on food every year, as against the French £2. 16s. 2d., and Dutch £2. 16s. 5d. It was not thought degrading for a Duke of Grafton⁵ to quarrel over a coach fare, and to be seen "at fisticuffs in

¹ O'Meara's "Napoleon at St Helena" (ed. 1888), p. 122.

² "England's Guide to Industry": "To the Reader."

³ Edward Leigh's "Select Observations," etc., p. 272 (1657).

⁴ Gregory King's "Observations upon the State of England," p. 67.

⁵ Misson's "Memoirs and Observations," pp. 305-6.

the open street with such a fellow whom he lamb'd most horribly." The best Non-conformist¹ writer of the day wrote complacently of the "decent and harmonious bagpipes," which accompanied bear baiting. The zest for field sports was immense, and even the quiet French refugee—Misson—was so infected by the enthusiasm as to write that "footballs is a useful and charming exercise."² The athletic barbarians whom he met never had dessert or dainties; they lived on great quantities of ill-cooked meat³ and substantial vegetables, served with streaming butter.⁴ "England is as it were a large cook shop," and they enjoyed to live in it. No wonder they could despise Frenchmen, whom they imagined to "live upon nothing but herbs and roots,"⁵ and that Spaniards⁶ believed them to live by selling ale to one another. They came ultimately to be typified by the bluff, well-fed, hearty and shrewd John Bull of the eighteenth-century caricaturists. There was nothing in the world so cheery as his loud "Huzza," which Coronelli derived from "Hossannah." "What a charming thing it is to understand etymology!"⁷

¹ Alsop's "Melius Inquirendum," p. 23.

² Misson, p. 307. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

⁴ "Anglorum Speculum," p. 36.

⁵ Misson, p. 125. ⁶ Alsop, p. 119.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

CHAPTER VI

THE EFFECTS OF THE REVOLUTION

THE development of political intelligence, which had been so remarkable under Charles II., was stopped under James II., for religions and constitutional troubles again engrossed men's minds, and the incipient Imperialism was forgotten. It was England's duty to join Holland and the Empire against France, and this path of honour was the way to glory. Public opinion, however, was too perturbed by persecution at home to recognize the need abroad. It was indeed urgent. When the Great Elector lay dying in April 1688, he murmured the words, "London, Amsterdam," because an alliance between the two maritime powers was the one hope of oppressed Europe. Louis XIV. was filling its cup of humiliation to the brim, but his boast of being "*nec pluribus impar*" would remain a reality until Great Britain could be induced to view a general union against him with favour. Under James II. this was

impossible. He was no sooner on the throne than he accepted £60,000 from Barillon,¹ with tears of gratitude in his eyes, and though he did try to act independently of Louis, the French King always regarded him as a tool—even if an obtuse one.

Happily, the continuity of English policy was only suspended, not broken, in 1685, for the rule of James II. was too intolerable to last. A man with more good-humour would at least have cloaked his defiance of popular wishes, for good-humour² was then deemed a peculiarly national virtue, and even now may cover a multitude of sins. It was the one redeeming feature of Charles II. to have been an amiable companion.³ However, no member of his obstinate family—not even Charles I.—was ever so resolutely opposed to all his subjects' hopes as this gloomy and vindictive king. There had indeed been a time when he was far from despicable. He had been a governor of the Royal African Company,⁴ and an energetic Lord High Admiral. He had taken some interest in the growth of commerce, so that the allusion to his trade patronage in an address presented to him by the Society of the Middle

¹ C. J. Fox's "James the Second" (ed. 1888), p. 63.

² Chamberlayne's "Present State of Great Britain" (ed. 1723), p. 31; cf. the toast given in the *Spectator*, No. 195.

³ "Letters of Junius" (ed. 1878), i. 155.

Pepys' Diary, p. 581 (12th April 1669).

Temple, hardly deserved Fox's contempt.¹ At one time even, he had so little of his later inhuman self-absorption that Pepys found him "upon a carpet on the ground . . . playing at 'I love my love with an A,'" ² in the witty and joyful company of Lady Castlemaine, and "all the great ladies." The anxiety, however, through which he passed during the period of the Exclusion Bill and Popish terror, had soured a nature which was morose by predilection, and he was ready to sacrifice his country in order to clear the way to absolutism and Catholic supremacy.

James II. was no worse a man than Charles II. He had fewer mistresses; Arabella Stuart and Catherine Sedley alone gained notoriety. Possibly also he had a grain more patriotism, for he had not his brother's love of Bourbon ideas and French habits, and would have liked to do without Barillon and to play the man. ³ Men said he felt a pride of race when, in May 1692, he saw his own allies shattered at la Hogue by an English fleet. His views, however, were completely out of harmony with the social medium of his age, and while he was king there was no chance of such a coin-

¹ C. J. Fox's "James the Second" (ed. 1888), p. 69.

² Pepys' Diary, p. 568 (4th March 1669).

³ St Simon's "Memoirs," i. 9.

cidence of national and dynastic interests as England had enjoyed from 1660 to 1674. Charles II. could still pass as "a good prince and a man of wit;"¹ James claimed neither attribute. Sincerity has been urged as an extenuating circumstance for his defiance of the people, but it is never a real excuse. It might be advanced to justify a long line of fanatics from Hildebrand to Torquemada, from Philip II. to modern anti-Semites. His lies and tricks indeed effectually disqualify James from any such refuge, because even from a moral and impersonal point of view he was detestable. Moreover, History has in any case nothing to do with morals pure and simple; a character may be held unutterably exasperating without being ethically monstrous.

Owing to the folly of the King, public opinion between 1685 and 1689 was merely directed to resist his policy; it ceased to be interested in foreign affairs. Had James been a better man, the Grand Alliance might have been formed in 1685 instead of in May 1689, and had he been the same man, only with a touch of tact, he might have postponed it altogether. As it was, he magnified a natural grudge against the men who had tried to oust him by an Exclusion Act in May 1679 and March 1681, into a resent-

¹ Misson's "Memoirs and Observations," p. 32.

ment against the whole nation, outside his own confederates and co-religionists. He treated the best thought of the country with a crass disdain.

Yet if James II. was primarily responsible for the oblivion of England's true mission, it must also be remembered that the Whigs showed a great want of political taste. They were not as apathetic as the King to the trend of European affairs, but few of them saw beyond the party need of the hour, and grasped (as William of Orange grasped) the imperative necessity for England to join and to lead a general league against France. So low was the standard of political morality, that men like Sidney and Powle had stooped to take French bribes, while few even among the better opponents of the Court realised that the hope of the land was in the Stadtholder, and that no good could possibly come either from an unpatriotic republican like Argyle,¹ or from a shallow nonentity like Monmouth. The country party who supported such ungenerous leaders had no chance of controlling them, for it was ignorant and ill-informed. The splendid rustics, whose blood dyed the dank fields that lie between Bridgwater and Sedgemoor, and the whetstones of whose scythes can be

¹ For Argyle, *see* Ranke, iv. 246, and Macaulay, ii. ch. 5.

seen to this day in the grey church of Weston Zoyland, were incapable of framing any logical or synthetic policy at all. Their idol, Monmouth, was a man of straw. Since he first dazzled society in 1662 as ¹ "Mr Crofts, the King's bastard, a most pretty spark of about fifteen years old," his hold on the imagination of the ignorant had slowly become magnetic. He was at the best but "the most skittish leaping gallant that ever I saw," ² and his fascination did not lie in any good sense, but in cheerful and conciliatory levity. Hamilton ³ described him as a brainless Adonis, beside whom Charles's other children seemed so many little puppets. The rougher kind of Whig was won over by his delusive charm to sympathise with him as with a disinherited Protestant, and to cherish a belief in the mythical "black box." His hope was sincere enough, for the Duke's interest was the same as his,

"And pity never ceases to be shown
To him who makes the people's cause his own." ⁴

Nevertheless, for several years before James became king, the commercial classes had ceased to believe in so feeble a hero as

¹ Pepys' Diary, p. 116 (7th Sept. 1662).

² *Ibid.*, p. 250 (26th July 1665).

³ Hamilton's "Memoirs of Count Grammont," p. 329.

⁴ Dryden's "Absalom and Achitophel."

Monmouth, and their patient adherence to the more legitimate methods of resistance to the Crown eventually relieved the country from its distress. James's foolish attacks on the Seven Bishops and on Magdalen were quietly foiled. A revival of public spirit, and a new sense of purpose were the first fruits of the Revolution; the self-control which distinguished it was the best proof of the sanity and vigour of English opinion under Charles II. which could thus live through the dark days of political reaction. Locke's political philosophy recognized the rule of law, and so differentiated the rebels of 1688 from all other revolutionaries.

Conservatism is an essential component of every well-balanced mind, and the men who overthrew James II. and passed the Bill of Rights, had a respect for constitutional traditions which is almost tedious. Their sober judgment, however, shows what an intellectual advance had been made in the national character since the day when reformers held royal tyranny and the harmless foibles of society in equally unmeasured detestation. The rule of the saints had failed, because it rested on the force of arms alone, whereas the settlement of 1689 was the making of modern England, because it was based on broad lines of moderation and good sense. The "Venetian oligarchy"

worked better than Stuart despotism. Government was essentially judicious. The Bench threw off the methods of Jeffreys, and in 1694, the House of Lords¹ laid down that the epithet "disaffected" did not amount to slander. Ten years earlier, its use would have sent a man to Newgate.

The Revolution, however, by no means endowed the country with unity of ideas. It gave to the national policy the impress of maritime and commercial ambition, but men still hesitated to adopt the place which William wished England to occupy in European politics. It is true that war with France lasted from May 1689 to the Peace of Ryswyk in September 1697, and broke out again in 1701, but it evoked little of the zeal and devotion which animated later conflicts. Even after Louis had burnt Heidelberg (March 1689), Spire (May 1689), and Worms (June 1689), the average Englishman felt little active sympathy with the sufferers, and the defeat off Beachy Head in June 1690 alone stirred the nation to a proper sense of its responsibility. The populace hated the trusty Dutch Guards, and after long mocking at their "whiskers"² (moustaches) and Orinoco tobacco, rejoiced at their departure from the country in 1699.

¹ Duvall v. Price. Eng. Rep. (House of Lords), i. 11.

² Larwood's "London Parks," p. 375.

Even men like Shrewsbury and Godolphin, Russell and Marlborough, who owed so much to William, thought nothing of betraying him. Those inferior in station to such politicians were similarly guilty, but in some cases for more creditable motives. They rebelled against a policy which was bound to lead to a long European war.

The explanation of their hostility to the militant policy of the King lies in the introduction by the Revolution of a new and lasting line of cleavage in English public opinion. For nearly a century, intelligent men had believed in one uniform theory as to trade and Empire. After 1689 they divided into two parties, both aiming at the prosperity of British commerce, but disagreeing entirely as to the means to further it. One school wished the government to play a decisive part in the affairs of the world, and thought colonial development impossible without self-assertion in Europe. They thought the balance of power essential to the maintenance of a right balance of trade.

William III. found his only English friends among this party — Sunderland, Somers, Temple, Sidney. He had little in common with most of his new subjects; his enemies were not necessarily theirs. "Oh, the insolent nation!"¹ he exclaimed

¹ St. Simon's "Memoirs," i. 33.

as his troops fell back at Neerwinden in 1693 after a fight of twelve hours in blazing sunshine, in which twenty thousand men fell as victims of his great enemy's ambition, and it was solely to crush French pride that he endured English life, where even Hampton Court and Kensington Palace were inadequate substitutes for the delights of Loo and Dieren. His crusade¹ against Louis XIV. absorbed his whole mind, whereas to his Whig allies it was only a side issue to the politics of England. The King was like Cromwell, no "poor mouldy pedant or constitution monger;" on the contrary, he believed in the efficacy of government by a "single person" as fervently as either Strafford or the Protector. The help of so alien a statesmanship as his was not powerful enough to make the advocates of a forward policy in Europe securely supreme. They could not withstand with complete success the attacks of the opposing school of thought.

In the history of English politics, the Tory view of non-interference abroad connects the opposition to Raleigh's policy with that against the plans of Chatham. It was a return to the cautious frame of mind which characterised Burleigh, and it foreshadowed that of Walpole. Against

¹ See Ranke, v. 297-302.

William's great scheme of European alliance against France men argued that it was no business of England what happened on the Continent, and that incidents like the appropriation of Strasburg and the devastation of the Palatinate had no real interest for an insular state. They looked with more concern at the declining population¹ of their own country, at its sinking revenue,² increasing taxation and growing pauperism.³ Like the Whigs of the Napoleonic era, they wished other countries to work out their own salvation.

"Enough for Europe has our Albion fought,
Let us enjoy the peace our blood has bought."⁴

The analogy between the opposition to William III. and to Marlborough, and that against Pitt and Castlereagh is so striking that⁵ Cobbett pointed to what he called the noble stand made against the employment of Dutch troops, when he exhorted his readers to hamper Wellington's campaigns in the Peninsula. He repeated the tactics of Swift in attacking the constant enlargement of the national debt.⁶ The

¹ Gregory King's "Observations upon the State of England" (1696), p. 43.

² *Ibid.*, p. 61.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

⁴ Dryden's lines "To my honoured kinsman John Dryden" (1699).

⁵ Cobbett's "Political Register," xvii. 86 (1810).

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

Tories of William's reign were, however, stronger than the Radical faction of 1809 for the Revolution had helped them by its repudiation of a standing army. The Mutiny Act, passed every year after 1689, gave it discipline but no popularity. In 1698 the army¹ in England was reduced from nearly 15,000 men to 7000. Marlborough's army never included at one time more than 19,000 British soldiers,² although the French army numbered 400,000; at Blenheim he had only 8500 in a force of 52,000. The Tory party believed in naval enterprise, but thwarted all attempts to make England a military power. They saw with alarm the rapid growth of the national debt under the management of men "who by their birth, education, and merit, could pretend no higher than to wear our liveries."³

The future, however, was with the cause of Empire. Great Britain had to become a world power, and in spite of the long reaction during the great peace ministry of Walpole, the ultimate effect of the Revolution was the renunciation of national quietism. It may be that Empire makes eventually for peace, but it assuredly makes for active work always. Only the charm which attaches to

¹ Ranke, v. 188.

² Lecky, ii. 439.

³ Swift in No. 15 of the *Examiner* (1710).

splendid oratory such as Bolingbroke's, and to splendid finance such as Walpole's, can deter a trading people from action abroad. Even under William III. men came slowly to realise the momentous issue of the French war. In 1692 the gallantry¹ of the defeated army at Steinkirk was splendid. Maritime losses, however, were more keenly felt, for Colbert's plans survived him, and when Jean Bart,² escaping with seven ships from the blockade of Dunkirk, burnt eighty vessels off Newcastle, England saw the evils of her inertia. The loss of the *Scarboroughh*³ and the *Nonsuch*⁴ was avenged by the capture of the *Content*⁵ and the *Trident*,⁶ and Duguay-Trouin's successes were neutralised by the bombardment of St Malo and Dunkirk.⁷ Thus public opinion was gradually coloured by the lessons of the Revolution. When the Assassination Plot was discovered in 1696 London was gay with orange ribbons inscribed with the words, "No Popery! No Slavery!"⁸ On 9th November 1699, twenty thousand people watched the three troops of Lifeguards parade before the King

¹ Macaulay, vi. 290.

² V. C. Préseau's "Grandes Figures Nationales" (1870), p. 228.

³ 18th July 1694.

⁴ 3rd Jan. 1695.

⁵ 27th Jan. 1695.

⁶ 4th July 1695.

⁷ 1st August 1695.

⁸ Misson's "Memoirs and Observations," p. 10.

in Hyde Park,¹ and delighted in their scarlet coats, and in their feathers and ribbons of white, red and green. It was impossible not to feel contempt for James, whose solace² in exile lay in wearing no mourning for his daughter Mary, when she died in December 1694, and in drinking champagne,³ which he only obtained by pressing requests from the blunt and unwilling Archbishop of Rheims.

Finally, the magnanimous folly, which made Louis XIV. recognize the son of James II. as King of England, when the banished monarch ("much impressed"⁴ by his host's kindness) passed away at St Germain in September 1701, cleared English politics of its sophistry, and sent the government into the course of action, which won so much glory for the country under Queen Anne. This policy was the logical outcome of the Revolution settlement. In spite of Harley and Bolingbroke, it seems to us to-day to have been the natural sequel to the development of British commerce and of the national intelligence. The fate of colonies then unknown, as well as of existing plantations, hung on the issue of Blenheim and Ramillies. Men, who talk glibly elsewhere

¹ Larwood's "London Parks," p. 73.

² St Simon's "Memoirs," i. 60.

³ *Ibid.*, i. 167.

⁴ *Ibid.*, i. 231.

of moral triumphs, have asked the purpose of Marlborough's victories. The answer is embodied in the Empire¹ of to-day, as well as in the letter which the Emperor Leopold wrote himself to the hero of Blenheim. "You have erected to the most illustrious and potent Queen of Great Britain, a monument of victory in Upper Germany, whither the glorious arms of the English nation have never penetrated before within the memory of man."²

At the same time, the Tories can hardly be described as fools and "ninny hammers," because they were slow to grasp the lesson of the Revolution. William III. never reached the heart of the people. When the Attorney-General opened the case against Sacheverell in 1710, he referred to the late King, as our redeemer "from Popish tyranny and arbitrary power,"³ but he had no other claim to popularity. He was no democrat; he hated Whig pedantry and ignored the party system. He did not even bring prosperity, for rents were low and trade bad, the only manufacture⁴

¹ Seeley's "Expansion of England," p. 131. For the other view, Wyon, ii. 438.

² Vehse's "Memoirs of the Court of Austria" (ed. 1896), p. 75.

³ "Tryal of Dr. Henry Sacheverell" (House of Peers' Report, 1710), p. 17.

⁴ "Discourse of Ways and Means," p. 283.

which throve in 1697 being that of peri-wigs. He enriched his Dutch favourites, supported unprincipled statesmen like Sunderland, and persisted in war in spite of the passing wave of poverty and distress in England. His control over foreign policy¹ was the basis of his power in Europe, but it did not qualify him for glory as a constitutional monarch. In the face of numberless Jacobite plots, he could hardly court applause like Charles II. by a genial ubiquity, but there was something unnecessarily forbidding in the atmosphere of his government. His English servants were all time-servers, and the memoirs of Smith and Kingston clearly show how any "silly meddling fellow who picked up scraps of coffee-house intelligence"² might discredit a good cause. Money being scarce, Lord Portland could only reward Smith for his information with "fifty guineas roll'd up in a piece of paper,"³ and later with a bill for fifty pounds "at the back stairs at Whitehall." The trail of scheming and spying lay over all the public life of the day, and the consequent odium centred on the brave but sombre foreigner on the throne.

¹ Matthew Smith's "Memoirs of Secret Service" (1699), p. 43.

² *Ibid.*, p. 11.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

His distribution of the forfeited Irish lands among Dutch and other favourites, provoked a protest, which bordered on injustice.

William III. had also to bear the brunt of the attacks made by lovers of peace on the whole policy of interference abroad. The strength of this new diversion in popular sentiment was shown in the next reign when it blazed out against the Whig ambition of European greatness, and left a splendid literary memorial in Swift's "Conduct of the Allies." It can hardly be questioned that this view was then more characteristically English. Men hated France, but London coffee-houses¹ and the resorts of officers out of place were the only centres of those willing to burden the country with debt for an apparently immaterial cause. Swift wrote that "it will no doubt be a mighty comfort to our grandchildren, when they see a few rags hung up in Westminster Hall, which cost a hundred millions, whereof they are paying the arrears, to boast as beggars do that their ancestors were rich and great." It is always easy to fling the responsibility for war upon "usurers and stock-jobbers."²

¹ Swift: "The Conduct of the Allies" (Selected Works ed. 1888), p. 181.

² *Ibid.*, p. 185.

Swift did so under Anne. Her predecessor had no scapegoat at all.

In spite, however, of William's personal unpopularity, the nation as a whole did ultimately acquire a healthy homogeneity¹ of ideals and a considerable community of prejudice, which no mere party feud could destroy. The struggle with France was the inevitable result of the Revolution, and for more than a century the Frenchman² was deemed not only an object of ridicule, but also a natural enemy whether the two peoples were at peace or at war. The balance of trade was against England. The rate of exchange³ was always in favour of France except in 1687-8, and from £965,000⁴ to £1,600,000⁵ worth of goods represented the amount imported here, over and above the amount exported from England to France. Consequently the national economist looked askance at "silks, satins, armoysins, paduasoyes, tabbies and gallowns, feathers and toys, coverlets, verjuice, castle-

¹ Swift in the *Examiner*, No. 16 (1710); "Let any one examine a reasonable, honest man of either side. . . he shall hardly find one material point in difference between them."

² Ozell's Preface to "Misson" (1719), p. iii.

³ "Petitions against Trade with France," pp. 9-11.

⁴ Cobbett's "Parliamentary History," vol. iv. appx.

11.

⁵ Chamberlayne's "Present State of Great Britain," p. 36.

soap and olives, combs and gloves," and dis-
countenanced such commerce. English silk
throwsters¹ desired a Merchandise Marks
Act for foreign "alamodes, lustrings and
ranforcees." The imitator of Parisian habits
was despised as "an ape,"² and a couplet
of 1702 declares that

"Our native speech we must forget ere long
To learn the French, that much more modish tongue."³

The question of language was indeed
often debated, and patriots pleaded for pure
English. For this cause, Eustace Budgell⁴
wrote his essay on grammar schools, in
which he urged that more attention should
be given to English letters and less to Latin
epigrams, themes and verses. The French
were said to be addicted to "vanity, pre-
tensions to satire, raillery and the like,"⁵
and misrepresentations added a spark to
the popular hatred. The rising Press
was successful in embroiling nations. The
hostility was therefore constant and bitter,
military and commercial, shown alike in
the Methuen Treaty with Portugal, and
in war after war. Even the courtesy which

¹ "Petitions against Trade with France," pp. 14-15.

² "Anglorum Speculum," p. 36.

³ "The Baboon à la Mode" (1702), quoted in
Ashton, p. 65.

⁴ *Spectator*, No. 353.

⁵ Chamberlayne's "Present State of Great Britain,"
p. 31.

prompted French bands to play for British messes on the banks of the Nive in November 1813, belonged to a later and gentler age. The idea that the French were natural enemies of England became as general as it had been three centuries earlier. The best means to encourage navigation was held to be "a bridle to the French King,"¹ and John Crowne's Protestant zealot in "Sir Courtly Nice"² became a common type. In letters, French influence long remained great. Pope and Garth alike found a model in Boileau's "Le Lutrin," and Gallic wit had a genial echo in the mock heroism of "The Rape of the Lock." The classic writers of Queen Anne's day, however, added a sturdy interest in politics to the fastidiousness of stylists, and could take an active part in national affairs, writing poems the while like Prior—

"In a little Dutch-chaise on a Saturday night
On my left hand my Horace, a nymph on my right."³

Such men did not revere France; the lower orders loathed her. The uneducated politician was always ready to applaud any effort to "oblige the French King to burn his gallies and tolerate the Protestant religion;"⁴ any opponent to such a policy

¹ "England's Safety," 1693.

³ "The Secretary" (1699).

² 1685.

⁴ *Spectator*, No. 481.

was "an insignificant prig."¹ After all, the whole morality of Europe had been degraded by Louis XIV. A writer² in the *Spectator* pertly attributed to French influence "the ostentation of riches, the vanity of equipage, shame of poverty and ignorance of modesty." Half a century later a humourist³ pleaded against the importation of French words into English, such as "canaille," "manœuvre," "chicane," "bagatelle." As "reconnoitre" only means "take a view," "we beg leave it may be sent home again"—a prayer of ineffectual patriotism.

The reason why hatred of France became such a cardinal point in the opinion of Englishmen was the predominance of a national view of economics. The Revolution had destroyed the only two principles which can ever temper that combination of patriotism and the commercial spirit, which is called Imperialism. The one disturbing principle is the dynastic, the other the religious. The former had previously diverted the right trend of British policy, but the Revolution ended the whole system by which national interests were subordinated to royal alliances and far-reaching marriages. The one dis-

¹ *Spectator*, No. 481.

² *Ibid.*, No. 139.

³ "Annual Register" (1758), p. 373.

advantage¹ of its disappearance lay in the tendency to regard Scotland and Ireland again as foreign nations, which was certainly the case under William III., when bad laws set up obstacles against union and good-will. On the other hand, it made the Hanoverian succession possible. The sentiment that always gathers round lost causes and fallen greatness, soon softened the memory of the Stuarts, but it faded out of practical politics, and Church services on 30th January and "scarlet gown"² days like 29th May at Oxford, had little hold on the opinions of the intelligent. St. Simon³ caustically compared Berwick's expectation of an English rising with a Jew's hope for the Messiah.

The decline of theological influences on popular politics was really of greater moment ; it was one of the chief characteristics that differentiated the England of Charles II. from the England of the eighteenth century, for philosophic criticism led gradually to Hume's systematic scepticism. The Revolution secularised public opinion, and the Sacheverell agitation was only a short-lived reaction. The nonjuror represented as

¹ "Discourse of Ways and Means," p. 89.

² Chamberlayne's "Present State of Great Britain," p. 712.

³ St. Simon's "Memoirs," i. 142.

effete a tradition after 1689, as the Anabaptist and Fifth Monarchy man after 1660. In spite of his practice of the royal touch, Charles II. himself had been too cynical to believe too sincerely in the divinity of kings. He would rather have said with his famous grandfather, Henry IV., "When I was born there were a thousand other souls more born. What have I done for God more than they?"¹ When Tillotson could exclaim from the pulpit of Lincoln's Inn Chapel² that the expulsion of a king was "a deliverance full of mercy and I had almost said full of miracle," the theory of divine right was surely doomed. The cleverest divines ceased to be reactionary; Ward and Wilkins had been pioneers of the scientific movement. As a rule, however, the clergy were wanting in rationalism. The decline of their position under Charles II. had been steady; a few such appointments as that of Lady Castlemaine's uncle ("a drunken, swearing rascal"³) to the Deanery of Bristol, were enough to bring the Church into disrepute. Convocation no longer taxed itself, but its concession did not enable clergy to sit in the Commons. John Oldham, the railer against

¹ Dedicatory Epistle to Leigh's "Choice Observations of all the Kings of England" (1661).

² 31st Jan. 1689.

³ Pepys' Diary, p. 425 (29th July 1667).

Jesuits, painted¹ the parson as an unhappy menial. The Huguenot, Misson, an absolutely impartial witness, remarks on the distress of all the clergy beyond a small favoured class. There are, he said, "a vast many poor wretches whose benefices do not bring them in enough to buy them cloaths."² Except Hickes and Kettlewell, the nonjurors were especial objects of contempt, and if Jacobites willing to compound were held tolerable, the extreme Stuart partisans were indeed "topping high-fliers."³

The disappearance of the ecclesiastical principle from public opinion as to foreign policy is now a commonplace. Since the Revolution it has only once been reasserted—when, under Queen Anne, a wave of High Church feeling overthrew Marlborough and the war party, and gained notable successes in the Occasional Conformity Act and Schism Act. Religion has often indeed affected home politics, as in the case of these two sinister laws, but it has never since then diverted to any extent the bent of British foreign relations. Even in domestic affairs, the Toleration Act of 1689 was the beginning of more sensible policy. In spite of

¹ "A Satyr addressed to a Friend," etc. (1703).

² Misson's "Memoirs and Observations," p. 36.

³ Matthew Smith's "Memoirs of Secret Service" (1669), p. 36.

the prevailing belief in the efficacy of the royal touch and the divinity of Charles I., we need only read the wretched polemics of Sacheverell and his partisans to realise the ephemeral nature of that theological reaction. It was the last breath of a dying faith. Phipps, who was counsel for the prisoner, asked whether the person of the Lord's anointed was less sacred then than in the days of David and Saul. Sacheverell himself pleaded in court, that to make the people the fountain of authority is to contradict "both gospel and the laws,"¹ that non-resistance² is the doctrine of God, and that Grindal, in urging toleration, was "a false son of the Church and a perfidious prelate."³ His sermon on "the perils of false brethren," which originated the commotion, and which depicted⁴ toleration as a base compliance with the pride of obstinate, self-conceited hypocrites and enthusiasts, was aptly described by counsel as having "cast black and odious colours upon his late Majesty and the said Revolution,"⁵ and, from a modern standpoint, harsher strictures would seem even more apt. Such opinions, at any rate, failed to survive the decay of religion which followed the coming of George I., and

¹ "Tryal of Dr. Henry Sacheverell," p. 6.

² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

scepticism, though it came slowly (even King¹ dated the Flood, B.C. 2800), slowly mastered unreasoning faith. In 1723, the contrast between clerical power in France and weakness in England was illustrated in the numbers of the clergy in the two countries. France² had 270,000; England 15,000 at most—in King's day (1696), 10,000. The revenue³ of the Gallican Church was seventy-five times that of the English.

The emancipation of politics from theology had, no doubt, a few bad effects. There was a complete dearth of spirituality in public life, and the people ceased to be religious. Policy was governed by an unedifying commercialism, until the elder Pitt came to give wings to the national ambition. In private life, the English⁴ were neither treacherous nor uncivil, but all foreign statesmen of the better sort, from Eugene⁵ to Kaunitz, considered Great Britain as ruled by the most selfish of governments. Ministers like Sir Robert

¹ King's "Observations," etc., p. 41.

² Chamberlayne's "Present State of Great Britain," p. 30.

³ Misson's "Memoirs and Observations," p. 239. He gives the figures respectively as £24,700,000 and £330,000; King's "Observations upon the State of England" (p. 48) allow £480,000 to be the income enjoyed by the clerical class.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 73-5.

⁵ Vehse's "Memoirs of the Court of Austria," ii. 3.

Walpole freed the country from distrust of the executive, but lowered the tone of her politics. On the other hand, the secularisation of public opinion gave England a wider mind and a more equable temper. The busy debaters of the coffee-house were inevitably better politicians than men who thought first of creed and then of national interest. The crowd at Portsmouth hailed "Charles III." of Spain with boisterous cheers,¹ and thousands were willing to fight for him in spite of his impenetrable Austrian bigotry. The clerical models of conduct had been consistently narrow, and the new freedom of thought was fruitful indeed. Just as Holland had been called Carthage, the England of Marlborough was considered a second Rome, and the typical British patriot was paralleled by the Cato of Addison. The standard of his virtues was stoic, not Christian, but was none the less effective and robust.

"'Tis not in mortals to command success,
But we'll do more, Sempronius, we'll deserve it." ²

The disappearance, therefore, of the dynastic and ecclesiastical elements from English public opinion in 1689 left the commercial and maritime principle supreme.

¹ Vehse's "Memoirs of the Court of Austria," ii, p. 91.

² Addison's "Cato."

The Revolution, in fact, did not separate two eras by a stroke of the sword, but rather set the seal on half a century of intellectual progress. It confirmed the predominance of political rationalism. The three chief signs of this achievement lasted uniformly for a century, and two of them at least survive to-day as emblems of the continuity of history. The first sign of the times was the novel greatness of the Press ; the second, the rise of the power of the towns ; the third, the popularity of the mercantile theory of economics. If each was foreshadowed under the later Stuarts, it was the Revolution which first gave them free scope, unchecked by Crown or Church.

The Press has never lost its wonderful position since the abandonment of the censorship in 1695. The series of Annual Registers are the best authorities for British history between 1758 and 1800, just as the leading newspapers are the most valuable records of the later days. With a powerful Press, public opinion needs no diligent research. Most men imbibe their politics from journalistic literature, and the pamphleteers of the period between the Restoration and the Revolution have had a vastly magnified posterity. The immediate effect of the fall of James II. was a revival of the political tract. The Whig writers scored their points

at the expense of the Jacobite fraternity at the Nag's-head¹ tavern in Covent Garden, and could criticise Ferguson's opposition writings as books "stuffed with such fulsome and notorious untruths that they cannot stand the test of any reasonable man."² The expansion of English letters under Anne was the most distinguished feature of the contemporary development of the national life, but the historian should connect it with the earlier development of the Press under Charles II. The *Kingdom's Intelligencer* was started in London in 1662, the *Intelligencer* in 1663, the *London Gazette* in 1665. This last paper had regular correspondents in all the British ports, while as early as 1658 news letters were sent weekly to England from Paris, Stockholm, Riga, Vienna, Hamburg, Amsterdam and Genoa.

The growth of the towns also completed the movement towards the commercial ideal, which had so marked the England of the last two Stuart Kings. In 1696³ Gregory King computed that out of a population of five and a half millions, 530,000 lived in London and 870,000 in other towns. He⁴ believed that the land was only less densely

¹ M. Smith's "Character of R. F.," etc. (1699), p. 15.

² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³ Gregory King's "Observations upon the State of England," p. 36.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

populated than Holland and China. Sir Andrew Freeport took the place of Sir Roger de Coverley as a social magnate. The greatness of London¹ continued; its population reached 600,000 in 1700. Bristol,² second only to the capital as a trading city, had five thousand houses and over 30,000 inhabitants, who generously dispensed the celebrated Bristol milk³ (or sherry sack) to all strangers. Norwich was nearly as large; eight or nine thousand persons were engaged in the Taunton cloth trade,⁴ and three thousand in the Wiltshire woollen industry.⁵

The true novelty of the age was, however, the rise of northern places. According to Chamberlayne, Manchester became noted for its "very great trade for woollen and linnen manufactures,"⁶ but its true staple was already cotton, which was packed in "tickin,⁷ tyed with tape, and bound with poynts and laces." Birmingham was famous for "curious manufactures in steel,"⁸ Sheffield "for smiths' trade,"⁹ especially in knives and tools, Leeds

¹ Misson's "Memoirs and Observations," p. 23;
"England's Guide to Industry," p. 25.

² Chamberlayne's "Present State of Great Britain,"
p. 10.

³ "Anglorum Speculum," p. 755.

⁴ Chamberlayne, p. 18.

⁵ "England's Guide to Industry," p. 25.

⁶ Chamberlayne, p. 13.

⁷ "Anglorum Speculum," p. 424.

⁸ Chamberlayne, p. 20.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 22. Cf. "Anglorum Speculum," p. 880.

"for clothiers." Moreover, civic progress did not then mean crowded towns and unhealthy conditions. Water-power alone was known; the age of steam still lay in the future. Consequently the towns were, if anything, healthier than the country, and both were steadily prosperous between 1660 and 1688. The common people were traditionally "great flesh-eaters;"¹ nearly half the population had meat daily, and another quarter had it twice a week. Besides, "after twelve hours' hard work they will go in the evening to football, stool ball, cricket, prisoners' base, wrestling, cudgel-playing."² In politics, the towns were the mainstay of rational legislation, and the reign of William III. witnessed the origin of the National Debt and the Bank of England. The opposition Tory Land Bank was a failure, and the Government could borrow at the constant rate of six per cent. interest, while Louis XIV. found it hard to raise a loan at twenty, and eventually failed to raise one at all.

The third characteristic effect of the uprooting of dynastic and religious prejudices by the Revolution was the undisputed supremacy of the mercantile theory. In the face of the £1,600,000³ excess of French exports over

¹ "Anglorum Speculum," p. 188; King, p. 55.

² Chamberlayne, p. 32.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

the value of all English woollens, serges, lead, pewter, and coals imported there, the Crown could no longer argue monarchical partiality as a valid objection to a Protective policy. Measures had to be taken to oppose Colbert's bounties¹ on Lyons velvets, Paris silks and hats, Breton salt and Chalons serges. Heavy duties² were also placed on French wine, brandy, salt, linen, pepper, silks, and East Indian goods. Population was encouraged to increase by a curious tax on bachelors and widowers imposed in 1695. Home industries were steadily fostered. Of course, political economy condemns such a system, but her interpreters have always been happier in precept than in practice, and the man of the world will at all events find an inspiring patriotism in a typical incident recorded by the "Annual Register" of 1761.

The county of Buckingham sent "to the King a pair of fine ruffles made by Messrs Milward & Co. at Newport Pagnell; his Majesty was most graciously pleased to express himself, that the inclination of his own heart naturally led him to set a high value upon every endeavour to improve any English manufacture . . . preferred by him to works possibly of higher perfection made in

¹ "Discourse on Ways and Means" (1697), pp. 189-90.

² Dowell, ii. 59.

any other country." The feeling which prompted such words was largely created in the second half of the seventeenth century, and the politicians who defeated Bolingbroke's free trade scheme in 1713 were members of the same political school as Shaftesbury and Albemarle. Their idea that political economy was a national science and not the same for all the world, was in fact clearly anticipated by the court in 1665, when it resolved "to spend nothing upon cloths but what is of the growth of England; which if observed will be very pleasing to the people."¹ The numerous petitions² against trade with France declared how far more profitable it was to deal with Turkey, Italy, and Portugal. The object of History is narrative, not dogma, but if any be inclined to flout the views which the Revolution period sanctioned in Great Britain as obsolete and heretical, they should recollect that Protection did not then mean dear bread. Agriculture was so successful that surplus corn³ was exported to Holland, Flanders, and Portugal. Industries were still young and demanded State support, while the farmer was also happy, as the land abounded "with wheat barley, rye, pulse, beans and oats, with excellent butter and

¹ Pepys' Diary, p. 265 (28th Sept. 1665).

² "Petitions against Trade with France," p. 19.

³ Chamberlayne, p. 32.

cheese, honey, saffron, and many other choice commodities for food, medicine and pleasure.”¹ If, therefore, the Tories who opposed the mercantile theory—Barbon, Child, North, Davenant—had a truer view of policy it was not because they had a greater grasp of economics, for they only took that view in opposition to the Whigs. As for the grosser fallacies of the theory—its identification of wealth with bullion, its depreciation of home trade, and its rejection of all individualism in favour of State interference and monopolist companies—such mistakes are the necessary adjuncts of any new phase in industrial society. The statesmen of the English Revolution were hardly persons from whom we should expect miraculous intuition. At any rate, they gave an impetus to manufactures and to shipping, and even their Physiocratic supplanters were no less liable to extravagance in argument. They also came gradually to abandon their prejudice against plantations as² tending to depopulate England, and believed them after all to be a good school for seamen and a good depot for naval stores. The commerce most typical of their idiosyncrasies was the slave-trade. A characteristic tract of 1697 recommends Guinea as a great market for

¹ Chamberlayne, p. 27.

² “Discourse of Ways and Means,” p. 86.

negroes, gold, and elephants' teeth—commodities very dear to the mercantilist's heart, because there was "no trade more likely to supply the want of coyn in this nation nor less liable to objections."¹ In 1693,² a decision of the House of Lords had vindicated the rule of law in plantations.

It will therefore be admitted that English public opinion between the Restoration and the Revolution decided the course in which the subsequent activity of the country has been directed. The attitude of the people towards Holland and France under Charles II. was not formed by any isolated caprice, but by a mature policy which foreshadowed the Imperialism of later times. One characteristic only of more modern England was then conspicuously absent. The humane perception of moral issues and moral triumphs, which has since marked British conduct towards the rest of mankind, was inconceivable in the Stuart age. It had nothing of the eighteenth-century benevolence. Even Cromwell never rose to the disinterested motives which made the government of George III. protect Canadian Catholics from New England oppression, and which moved

¹ "Discourse of Ways and Means," p. 129.

² *Dutton v. Howell*. Eng. Rep. (House of Lords), i. 21.

England under the younger Pitt to save herself by her exertions, and Europe by her example. The charity of the earlier day centred in the village; it could produce no Oglethorpe nor Howard to carry on a larger task. Men had then no sentimental view of nature, no unscientific vision of philanthropy. So liberal a mind as Alsop's¹ excluded unbelievers from toleration. Although he was a Presbyterian, we might perhaps have expected a loftier idealism from a book published "at the Angel and Bible in the Poultry."

Each epoch has, however, its own needs and its own measure of public policy. The subjects of Charles II. must not be judged in the light of a civilisation more advanced than their own, nor from the standpoint of a more exacting morality. They had still much of the earlier distaste for ethical scruples, although in private life they were by no means devoid of kindness. Sir William Coventry, who died in 1686, left £2000 to Huguenot refugees, and £3000 to redeem prisoners in Algiers. We have to avoid reading into the life and letters of the period any extravagant precocity. A large class of men were undoubtedly gifted and energetic, but they had been trained in the rude school of civil warfare, and their eyes had no impossible perspicuity. For them Cromwell was a despotic

¹ Alsop's "*Melius Inquirendum*," p. 173.

regicide, not the apostle of religious toleration, and Blake a daring adventurer, not the pioneer of Greater Britain. It would only be unfair to ascribe to their simple minds the more delicate aspirations of a different era. Nevertheless, their age was in many ways the seed-time of modern England, and each chapter in its annals conveys lessons for posterity. To learn them is to understand the Empire and to lighten its burden, for History is not antiquarianism, but rather a record of past experience, without the help of which, statemanship sinks to mere opportunism, and policy to instinct.

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